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The comparative commentary regarding the role of the apology in
dispute settlement has in large part revolved around the U.S.-Japan axis.
Beginning with the pioneering work of Professors Hiroshi Wagatsuma
and Arthur Rosett,' commentators have argued that cultural norms ex-
plain the Japanese tendency to apologize when one's actions have
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1. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Cul-
ture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'v REV. 461 (1986).
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resulted in the significant injury of another and the U.S. inclination to
refrain from apologizing or to deny responsibility in the very same situa-
tion.2 The legal system in each country jibes with the respective societal
inclination or disinclination to apologize. Recognizing that the apology
is an "important ingredient in resolving conflict,"3 Japanese legal institu-
tions have reinforced the societal use of the apology4 and integrated it
into their justice system.5 The culture of Japan is such that all of society,
including the bench and bar, expects and demands an apology from a
party causing harm or injury to another. There is no such expectation
stateside. The societal inclination not to apologize in the U.S. setting is
matched (and perhaps shaped) by a legal culture that advises clients not
to issue an apology for fear that it may be used against the apologizer as
an admission of legal liability.7 In the United States, the apology takes a
much "lower legal priority";8 the "legal doctrine based on apology" is
simply "underdeveloped"; 9 and the disconnect between the apology and
the legal system continues.
Perhaps Japan is frequently selected as the country of contrast to the
United States' because it is a "radically different culture,'"" a society
with persons of a different race and ethnicity and one with different val-
ues, norms, and attitudes. Although Japan's neighbors in East Asia could
also fit this description, the apology commentary addressing Korea'2 and
2. E.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1012-13 (1999) [hereinafter Cohen, Advising Clients]; Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apol-
ogy: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 850 (2002) [hereinafter Cohen, Legislating
Apology]; Deborah Levi, Why Not Just Apologize? How To Say You're Sorry in ADR, ALTER-
NATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 164 (Sept. 2000).
3. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 493.
4. John 0. Haley, Comment: The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 499,
506 (1986).
5. John 0. Haley, Apology and Pardon: Learning From Japan, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIEN-
TIST 842, 851 (1998).
6. Another commentator has used the terms "apologizer" and "apologizee" in the
apology discourse. Levi, supra note 2, at 163.
7. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 479, 483, 485; see also V. LEE HAMIL-
TON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN
AND THE UNITED STATES 47 (1992); Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1010; Erin Ann
O'Hara & Douglas Yam, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2002).
8. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 493.
9. Id. at 494.
10. Indeed, in the law dispute resolution commentary, discussion of the apology in the
U.S. setting includes the reflexive attachment that the U.S. practice is in sharp contrast to that
of Japan. E.g., Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1012-13; Cohen, Legislating Apol-
ogy, supra note 2, at 850; Levi, supra note 2, at 164.
11. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS
270 (2d ed. 1997); Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2, at 851.
12. The limited commentary addressing the apology in Korea includes Yong-Chul Im &
Soon-Mi Kim, Sah-jweh heng-we-eui sah-hwe-hwa-yong-rohn-juhk il-go-chal: hahn, il, joong
dae-hahk-seng-euljoong-sim-eu-roh [Research on Sociological Effect of Apology: Focus on
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China'3 is far more limited. 4 Yet the apology is no stranger to Korean
society. 5 A politician demanding an apology from another is a staple of
Korean domestic politics.'6 When two middle school girls were crushed
to death by a U.S. armored vehicle in a training exercise near Seoul in
2002, the Korean people's demand for an apology would not be satisfied
until the President of the United States apologized directly. 7 In September
Korean, Japanese, Chinese College Students], Sah-hwe-uhn-uh-hahk [J. SocIOLINGUISTICS] 89
(1997) (on file with author); Yunghwan Kwon, Cross Cultural Differences of Apology Between
Korean and American (2000), available at http://library.yonsei.ac.kr/dlsearch/Theme/
Yonsei/main.asp; In-Kyu Kim, Hahn-guk-uh sah-gwah hwa-heng-eui joong-gahn-uhn-uh-
rohn-juhk yuhn-gooh [An Interlanguage Study of the Korean Speech Act of Apology] (2002)
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, Seoul National University) (on file with author).
13. Of interest in the Chinese understanding of the apology is the widely reported inci-
dent on April 1, 2001, involving a U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter.
The two aircraft collided over the Hainan Sea; the Chinese aircraft was presumed to have
crashed with its pilot dead; the U.S. aircraft was forced to enter Chinese airspace and land in
China. China demanded an apology from the United States. U.S. diplomats expressed regret
but did not apologize. The incident led to some commentary on the Chinese understanding of
the apology. E.g., Peter Hays Gries & Kaiping Peng, Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,
11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 173, 173 (2002) (arguing that "both cultural differences and cultural
commonalities played a significant role" in apology diplomacy over the aircraft incident);
O'Hara & Yam, supra note 7, at 1138 n.56 (explaining four levels of apology in China); Hang
Zhang, Culture and Apology: The Hainan Island Incident, 20 WORLD ENGLISHES 383 (2001);
Margaret K. Lewis, Note, An Analysis of State Responsibility for the Chinese-American Air-
plane Collision Incident, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1404 (2002). For a discussion of the emphasis on
"face" in the Chinese understanding of the apology, see PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA'S NEW
NATIONALISM: PRIDE, POLITICS & DIPLOMACY 86-115 (2004).
14. This could merely be the result of a void in the commentary that is still developing;
interest in Korea and U.S.-Korea relations not yet matching that of Japan and U.S.-Japan rela-
tions; or the occasional popular tendency to group East Asian countries together extending
into academic discussion. E.g., HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM 155
(1995) ("East Asian collectivists use apologies as a social lubricant.").
15. All references to Korea herein are to the Republic of Korea, popularly known as
South Korea.
16. There are frequent media reports of this. E.g., Seok-Jun Hong, Speaker Wants Apol-
ogy for "Weed" Letter, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO, May 13, 2003, available at
http://english.chosun.coVw2ldata/html/news/200305/200305130005.html (last visited Sept.
25, 2005); Byung-Mook Choi, Rhee In-Je Apologizes to Lee Hoi-Chang, DIGITAL CHOSUN
ILBO, Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/
200212/200212060005.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005); Jong-Won Lee, President Apolo-
gizes for Bribery Scandal, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO, May 2, 2003, available at
http://english.chosun.com/w2ldata/html/news/200305/2003050
2 00 16.html (last visited Sept.
25, 2005); Chung Mong-Joon Issues an Apology, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 20, 2002,
available at http://english.chosun.comw2ldata/html/news/200212/200212200020.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2005); GNP Apologies for Part in Scandal, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO, Oct. 22,
2003, available at http://english.chosun.com/w2ldata/html/news/200310/20031020005.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
17. The deaths were widely reported and the incident became a charged affair in U.S.-
Korea relations. A U.S. military court court-martialed and acquitted the two servicemen in-
volved in the incident, a decision many Koreans bitterly criticized. The media reported that a
number of U.S. military officers and diplomats issued multiple apologies to the families of the
girls and to the people of Korea, including the commanding army general in Korea, a deputy
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2005, the newly inaugurated Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court
acknowledged that the judiciary had failed in the past to be independent
from authoritarian regimes and expressed deep regret for "causing anxi-
ety and damage to the public."' 8 One newspaper reported the event as the
judiciary's first formal, official apology for previous errors. '9 Of course,
any discussion of the apology in Korea must include mention of Korea's
continuing demand for an apology from Japan relating to the military
occupation of the Korean peninsula for the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury.20 Although the apology in the political arena is not the focus of this
secretary of state, and the U.S. ambassador to Korea. These apologies were considered unsat-
isfactory and public anger continued to grow. The U.S. ambassador then delivered an apology
from President Bush in November 2002, which indicated the President's "sadness and regret
over this tragic incident." See Min-Ku Kim, Civic Groups Shun Demanded US Apology, DIGI-
TAL CHOSWN ILBO, Nov. 27, 2002, available at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/
200211/200211270037.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005); Don Kirk, Bush Apologizes to South
Korea for U.S. Army Killing of 2 Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A12. Some Koreans
were still not satisfied and demanded a personal and public apology from the U.S. president.
Two weeks later, President Bush reportedly called the President of Korea and expressed "deep
sadness and regret," which was reported as an apology. President Bush Apologizes for School-
girls' Deaths, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 15, 2002, available at
http://english.chosun.comlw2ldata/html/news/200212/200212150005.html (last visited Sept.
25, 2005).
18. Gwang-Lip Moon, Lee Pledges To Break ies with Past Wrongdoings, KOREA
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1.
19. Gwang-Suhb Jung, Sah-bub-booh gwag-guh-sah gip-ee bahn-sung [Judiciary's
Deep Reflection of the Past], HANKYOREH, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1; see Challenge for Chief Jus-
tice, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 29, 2005, at 18 ("[W]e agree to the need for the judiciary to probe
past cases, make due apologies, and avow a new start ... ").
20. For a discussion, see Alexis Dudden, The Politics of Apology Between Japan and
Korea, in TRUTH CLAIMS: REPRESENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (Mark Bradley & Patrice
Petro eds., 2002). It appears there is some disagreement on whether Japan has sufficiently
apologized to Korea. For a Korean perspective, see 67% of S. Koreans Say Japan Did Not
Apologize for War, JAPAN EcON. WIRE, Jan. 2, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (report-
ing a survey indicating that two out of three Koreans do not believe Japan has apologized for
its victimization of Korea during the occupation years, 1910-1945). For a view from across
the sea, see LDP Policy Chieftain Needs a Diplomacy Lesson, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), June
4, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 9101860 ("Some Japanese react angrily, saying, 'How
many times must we have to apologize for historical issues?' "); Makoto Kito, Vast Psycho-
logical Gulf Keeps Japan, S. Korea Apart, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Dec. 18, 1995, available at
1995 WLNR 1244355 ("A series of comments by Japanese Cabinet ministers, who were trying
to justify the nation's war conduct, intensified the impression held by South Koreans that the
Japanese feel no sincere remorse for the past. This provoked irritation in Japan, which asks
how many times it must apologize before it is forgiven."). More recently, on August 15, 2005,
the 60th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War 11, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi reportedly apologized for his state's past militarism. (In Korea, August 15 is a na-
tional holiday, gwang-bohk-juhl, marking the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese
rule.) Koizumi stated, "Our country has caused tremendous damage and pain to the peoples of
many countries, especially Asian countries, through colonial rule and invasion. Humbly ac-
knowledging such facts of history, I once again reflect most deeply and offer apologies from
my heart." Noritmsu Onishi, Koizumi Apologizes for War; Embraces China and South Korea,
N.Y. T7MES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A4. Yet such words were received only skeptically in Korea. Id.
[Vol. 27:1
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Article, the above examples contribute to the Korean understanding of
the apology in situations where a member of the society suffers harm or
injury as a result of the actions of another.
An initial reaction might be that Korea's approach to the apology in
dispute settlement is much like the Japanese approach, considering the
influence of Confucian norms and values with respect to harmony and
conciliation in both countries.2 ' Yet there are also differences between the
two societies, and there is danger in equating the two with respect to the
perception and practical use of the apology. Korea has its own culture,
history, and language, all distinguishable from those of Japan. Perhaps
the basic difference between Japan and Korea is most vividly illustrated
by the continuing, though improving, social and political tension be-
tween the two states .2
This Article addresses the apology in civil dispute settlement in Ko-
rea, Japan's neighbor across the East Sea,23 using the U.S.-Japan
comparative discussion as a helpful frame of reference. Part I provides
the necessary background on the meaning of the apology and the leading
commentary along the U.S.-Japan axis, beginning with the work of Wa-
gatsuma and Rosett. Culture appears in this discussion in two regards.
First, a question arises as to whether the very meaning of the apology as
noted in the commentary reflects the U.S. cultural orientation, or instead
has universal application. Second, some argue that cultural norms ex-
plain the differences between the U.S. and Japanese use of the apology.
With this foundation in place, the discussion turns to Korea. Part II be-
gins with a brief description of the relevant social and political
developments in contemporary Korea, and then, using the specific cul-
tural indicators that shape the apology in Japan, examines the Korean
tendency to apologize. The discussion notes that although the indicators
suggest that Korea might have an approach quite similar or equal to that
seen in Japan, events and trends in contemporary Korea suggest that it is
too early to draw such a conclusion. Part III delves further into the Ko-
rean apology and Korean law, as well as the relationship between the
two. This Part begins with an introduction to what an apology means in
Korea, how it is delivered, and the legal culture's reaction to it. The dis-
cussion then addresses the specific issue of the legality of a court-
ordered apology in Korea, using the U.S. and Japanese positions as
comparative points of reference, and invites discussion on how each ju-
risdiction's approach might reflect its larger societal culture.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 120-132.
22. See Norimitsu Onishi, Japan and South Korea Brace for a Tense Meeting, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2005, at A6 (reporting on "months of strained relations over disputed territory
and Japan's militaristic past").
23. To all but Koreans, this body of water is known as the Sea of Japan.
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In brief, the collective sources indicate that the societal and legal
setting in Korea appears at first glance to be quite similar to that in
Japan, and indeed, in some respects the use of the apology in dispute
settlement in Korea is like the Japanese approach. Yet in other re-
spects, there are indications the Korean approach is leaning to its U.S.
counterpart. This Article provides an introduction to the Korean per-
ception of the apology, its role in the resolution of civil disputes, and
21the legal system's use of it in the settlement of claims .
I. APOLOGY AND THE U.S.-JAPAN Axis
A. Apology: The Background
The subject of the apology has received the attention of commenta-
tors in a variety of disciplines, including psychology,25 sociology,
26
linguistics,27 and anthropology," as well as law. From these various
contributions has emerged a growing bibliography that assists in the
understanding of the essential characteristics of the apology and its
relation to dispute resolution. The advanced state of the bibliography
now includes analysis of the various definitions of the apology phrase.
A recent survey of key works notes four elements in the common defi-
nitions of the term: "identification of the wrongful act, remorse,
promise to forbear, and offer to repair.' 29 An apology with all of these
24. The developing commentary might prove fruitful for those interested in U.S.-Korea
bilateral discussions, especially given the increasing tension on matters relating to, for exam-
ple, the North Korean situation and protection of U.S. intellectual property rights in Korea.
See Sang-Hun Choe, Gap Between Allies Widens over N. Korea-Seoul Objects to Harsher
U.S. Position, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Dec. 9, 2005, at 3; Ilhyung Lee, Culturally-Based Copy-
right Systems?: The U.S. and Korea in Conflict, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1155 (2001). Dispute
resolution professionals might also take note of the potential of the apology in resolving dis-
putes between Korean immigrants stateside. Cf Diane LeResche, A Comparison of the
American Mediation Process with a Korean-American Harmony Restoration Process, 9 ME-
DIATION Q. 323 (1992).
25. E.g., V. Lee Hamilton & Shigeru Hagiwara, Roles, Responsibility, and Accounts
Across Cultures, 27 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 157 (1992) (authored by a sociology-psychology
team); Ritsu Itoi, Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi & Mitsuteru Fukuno, A Cross-Cultural Study of Prefer-
ence of Accounts: Relationship Closeness, Harm Severity, and Motives of Account Making, 26
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 913 (1996).
26. E.g., HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 7 (a sociology-law team); Hamilton &
Hagiwara, supra note 25 (a sociology-psychology team).
27. E.g., Elite Olshtain & Andrew D. Cohen, Apology: A Speech-Act Set, in SOCIOLIN-
GUISTICS AND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 18 (Nessa Wolfson & Elliott Judd eds., 1983).
28. E.g., Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A
Cross-Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 285 (1986); Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note I (an
anthropology-law team).
29. O'Hara & Yam, supra note 7, at 1133. Other commentators' reviews of the leading
definitions yield similar elements. E.g., Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1014-15
[Vol. 27: l
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components is considered a "full" or "real" apology.30 In addition to
the formalistic, elemental definitions are the pithy, shorthand descrip-
tions of apology. For example, an apology is simply an offender being
32
sorry and saying so 3 or admitting that he did something wrong.
Beyond the definitional elements, essential components, or irreducible
minimums, there are also presentational requirements, which some
commentators appear to presume and others state explicitly. For
example, an apology must be voluntary,33 appropriately timed,34 and
("(i) admitting one's fault, (ii) expressing regret for the injurious action, and (iii) expressing
sympathy for the other's injury."). For their part, Wagatsuma and Rosett state that an apology
must include acknowledgment that "1. the hurtful act happened, caused injury, and was
wrongful; 2. the apologizer was at fault and regrets participating in the act; 3. the apologizer
will compensate the injured party; 4. the act will not happen again; and 5. the apologizer in-
tends to work for good relations in the future." Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 469-70.
The literature now includes descriptions of classes of apologies that do not meet the re-
quirements of the "full" or "real" apology, including the "conditional apology' "safe and
partial apology," see infra text accompanying notes 61-62, as well as the "explanation apology,"
"tactical apology," "formalistic apology," and "happy-ending apology." Levi, supra note 2.
30. Statements purporting to be apologies that lack one or more of the requisite ele-
ments, far from facilitating resolution of conflict, can lead to exacerbation and negative
consequences. SUSAN ALTER, APOLOGISING FOR SERIOUS WRONGDOING: SOCIAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 15 (Law Comm'n. of Can., 1999), available at
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/research-projectlicalpubs/apology/toc-en.asp; Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead,
Say You're Sorry, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1995, at 40, 42. Two examples, taken from the world
of politics, are President Nixon's statement in his resignation speech-"I regret deeply any
injuries that may have been done in the course of events that led to this decision," THEODORE
H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 350 (1975); and Senator Pack-
wood's statement in response to accusations of sexual harassment of several women-'Tm
apologizing for the conduct that it was alleged that I did." Lazare, supra, at 76. Commentators
have identified the statements of Nixon and Packwood as glaring failures in apology attempts.
Id. at 40, 76 ("botched"; "stunning portraits of failed apologies"); O'Hara & Yam, supra note
7, at 1133 ("two historically prominent but ineffective public apology attempts"); Lee Taft,
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1141 (2000)
("Senator Robert Packwood's failed apology eclipsed even Nixon's.").
31. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIA-
TION 36 (1991).
32. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Eric D. Green, & Frank E.A. Sander, Saying You're
Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221, 221 (1987); see also Lazare, supra note 30, at 76 ("To apolo-
gize, you have to acknowledge that you made a mistake."); Hamilton & Hagiwara, supra note
25, at 164-65 ("To apologize is to admit that harm was done."). Secretary of State Colin Pow-
ell made this point in explaining why the United States did not apologize for the incident over
the Hainan Sea involving the collision between U.S. and Chinese military jets: "[The United
States had] nothing to apologise for .... To apologise would have suggested that we had done
something wrong and were accepting responsibility for having done something wrong, and we
did not do anything wrong, and therefore it was not possible to apologise." Damian Whitworth
& Oliver August, China and US Claim Spy Plane Victory, TIMES (UK), Apr. 12, 2001, avail-
able at 2001 WLNR 3179591.
33. See Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1018.
34. See ALTER, supra note 30, at 2; Lazare, supra note 30, at 78; Levi, supra note 2, at
166; Goldberg, Green & Sander, supra note 32, at 223. Timing usually means that the apology
should come shortly after the offending act. ff an apology is made after repeated refusals or
ignoring the demand, "the apology is likely to appear forced." Levi, supra note 2, at 166. An
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35 36sincere," among other characteristics. Yet a successful apology is not a
function of a defined formula. An apology is a "complicated ... act
'3 7
and a "nuanced '38 and "amorphous"39 phenomenon. It deals in intangi-
bles40 and involves a dynamic unique to the participants; the end result
must provide "emotional satisfaction to both parties."4 ' For example,
non-verbal cues like body language and facial expression can show sor-
row, remorse, and sincerity.4
2 Context is also important.
4
1
In addition to the extensive literature on the meaning of the apol-
ogy," there is growing legal commentary addressing its role in facilitating
apology made after the desired time frame might confuse the apologizer, raise suspicions, and
result in a negative reception. Lazare argues that although an apology should be made right
away for minor offenses, this is not always the case for all offenses. For serious offenses:
such as a betrayal of trust or public humiliation, an immediate apology misses the
mark. It demeans the event. Hours, days, weeks, or even months may go by before
both parties can integrate the meaning of the event and its impact on the relation-
ship. The care and thought that goes into such apologies dignifies the exchange.
Lazare, supra note 30, at 78.
35. See ALTER, supra note 30, at 2; Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1017. The
complexity of the sincerity requirement includes the situation where the apologizer makes a
gut wrenching apology with full contrition and remorse (from her viewpoint), but the apolo-
gizee perceives the apology as insincere. See id. at 1052 (noting that an offender's "deep
expression of remorse" may be "a cavalier statement" to the injured). Or the apologizer apolo-
gizes, not taking the exercise seriously, but the apologizee perceives a sincere apology. Then
there is the line attributed to George Bums, "if you can fake sincerity, you can fake anything."
Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2, at 849.
36. It is the person whose conduct caused the injury, not a third party, who must apolo-
gize to the injured. In addition, the apologizer must identify herself. See U-2 Pilot Apologises,
ADVERTISER (Australia), Jan. 28, 2003, at 21 (reporting on an unidentified U.S. pilot, who
ejected safely from aircraft, and his statement of apology-"I am deeply sorry for injuries,
damage or suffering caused by this accident for anyone on the ground.").
37. Taft, supra note 30, at 1138.
38. O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1139. Or as Jonathan Cohen writes, "nuance is
critical in apology. A slight difference in shading-whether in word, presentation, or timing-
can produce a vast difference in perception. Something as 'trivial' as speed can determine an
apology's impact: An apology muttered quickly can sound far less sincere than one stated
deliberately." Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1051.
39. O'Hara &Yam, supra note 7, at 1131
40. See Levi, supra note 2, at 168 ("apology deals in intangibles rather than dollars and
cents").
41. Lazare, supra note 30, at 43.
42. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1140.
43. See id. at 1139.
44. The focus here is on the meaning of an apology as offered by commentators. A U.S.
court weighed in on the very question in a case where the court determined whether a letter
sent between the parties was an apology. See Mangini v. Astrella, No 1019, 2005 Phila. Ct.
C.P. LEXIS 167 (2005). In Mangini, the parties had entered into a settlement agreement,
which included a provision that the defendant counsel "will write a letter of apology to Mr.
Mangini on behalf of my client, Ms. Astrella." Id. at 5. The plaintiff argued that the letter he
received from the defendant's counsel was unsatisfactory, and therefore, the defendant had not
complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. The letter in question read:
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the resolution of a dispute involving legal claims and liabilities. An in-
jured party who receives an apology may more easily agree to a
settlement or withdraw her claim altogether .4  An apology offers non-
financial compensation for the injured party, which in some cases isS 46
more important than monetary reparation. The apology also has emo-
tional aspects: it serves a healing function47 and allows for restoration of
the self-concept, 48 "equality of regard,' 49 and dignity.
0
Any examination of the apology-including its meaning, purpose,
delivery, and relation to dispute resolution-invariably requires an ex-
amination of culture, since culture and cultural differences do shape and
affect the apology.5' A law and sociology team of authors goes so far as
I am writing this letter on behalf of my client, Carmella Astrella. Please accept this
letter as expressing Ms. Astrella's sincere regret with respect to the events which
transpired which led to your filing of the Complaint in this matter.
I wish you the best of luck in the future and I thank you for your courtesies.
Id. at 7. The court held that "the plain language of the 'apology letter' satisfies the reasonable
definition of 'apology'. If the Plaintiff had required a specific form or more specificity as to
the apology that should have been noted at the outset .... " Id. at 9. The decision may be one
of the few in which a court has determined what is or is not an apology. What was said to be a
satisfactory apology in Mangini appears to fall short of the requisite elements in the common
definition of an apology seen in the commentary.
45. See Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2, at 820; O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 7,
at 1122, 1124; Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, J.
Disp. RESOL. 115, 117 (1996) ("an apology, properly given and accepted, diffuses anger and
helps avoid litigation"). An important work by Professor Jennifer Robbennolt concluded that
an apology does indeed affect the chances for settlement, but that the type of apology given is
critical. Her study observed that a full apology, one in which the apologizer accepts responsi-
bility for having caused the injury, increased the likelihood that a settlement offer would be
accepted, while an apology that expressed sympathy only "increased participants' uncertainty
about whether or not to accept the offer." Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settle-
ment: An Empirical Examination, 102 MicH. L. REV. 460, 491 (2003).
46. See Levi, supra note 2 at 166 ("Apology ... has a chance to directly address psy-
chic, if not physical, injury. A meaningful apology may thus satisfy a plaintiff where monetary
damages would fail."); O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1125; see also ALTER, supra note 30,
at 5-6.
47. See ALTER, supra note 30, at 2, 5-6; Lazare, supra note 30, at 40, 42; Taft, supra
note 30, at 1136-38, 1156. Of course, for some wrongs, no apology will be enough to resolve
the dispute. Levi, supra note 2, at 167; O'Hara &Yarn, supra note 7, at 1132 n.36, 1139; Wa-
gatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 461.
48. See Lazare, supra note 30, at 43, 78.
49. Taft, supra note 30, at 1137.
50. See ALTER, supra note 30, at 4.
51. See Levi, supra note 2, at 164 ("effectiveness of... apology depends on the par-
ticipants' common culture and values"); Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1013 &
n.10; Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2, at 850-51. O'Hara and Yam express much
less enthusiasm for the proposition that culture and apology are interconnected. O'Hara &
Yarn, supra note 7, at 1128-29 & n.29. In their text, the authors do not "take a position one
way or another on the magnitude or importance of cultural differences in the context of apol-
ogy except to assert that reconciliatory behaviors, of which apology and forgiveness are
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to state that the "[a]pology, and the role it plays in dispute resolution, is
better understood as part of a society's culture" 52 How cultural norms in
Japan, the United States, and Korea affect the frequency of use of the
apology is discussed in some detail below. Yet culture is already present
in the above discussion relating to the basics of the apology. In particu-
lar, the descriptions of the definitional and presentational requirements
of the apology evoke parallels to the low-/high-context dichotomy in
communication. By introduction, the low- versus high-context dichot-
omy relates to the amount of information contained in the transmitted
message as opposed to the context (or setting) of the communication
event." According to Professor Edward T. Hall, in low-context commu-
nications most of the information is in the transmitted message, with
minimal "preprogrammed" information in the receiver and the setting;
high-context communications are the reverse.54 "[I]n a low-context cul-
ture .. . information is abundant; procedures are explicitly explained,
and expectations are discussed" with a literal, direct style of communica-
tion.5 In contrast, in high-context cultures, there is an expectation of
shared knowledge, the information is implicit, and the communication is
less direct.56 In the normal discourse, the low-/high-context dichotomy is
often used to distinguish between communication styles in different
countries. For example, the United States is considered a low-context
culture, while Japan is decidedly more high-context.57 Yet the above dis-
cussion regarding the meaning of the apology raises the question of
expressions, are present in all human cultures." Id. at 1129 n.29; see id. at 1146 ("[a]pologetic
and remedial behavior, although variable in their specifics, are found in most if not all cul-
tures."). They also note that: "[n]uances and the expression of an interpretation of apologetic
discourse may vary with culture," id. at 1140; and "[c]ulture may play an important role" in
explaining differences in apology and forgiveness between men and women. Id. at 1145-46.
In addition, "[o]f course, the expressions may vary substantially across cultures." Id. at 1129
n.29.
52. HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 7, at 46.
53. EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 79 (1976) [hereinafter HALL 1976]. This is
the original work to which most commentators cite. A more recent edition is also available.
EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 101 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter HALL 1989]. Hall col-
laborated on another work that includes many related themes. EDWARD T. HALL & MILDRED
REED HALL, UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1990).
54. HALL 1989, supra note 53, at 101; see also HALL 1976, supra note 53, at 79; see
also Pat K. Chew, The Pervasiveness of Culture in Conflict, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60, 62--63
(2004).
55. CARLEY H. DODD, DYNAMICS OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 89 (2d ed.
1987).
56. Id.
57. HALL & HALL, supra note 53, at 6-7. Societies with long social histories, shared
experiences, and free from foreign intervention tend to be high-context cultures. Both Korea
and Japan would fit this description.
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whether the apology act can also be considered under the low-/high-
context analysis."
At first glance, the apology might be seen as a low-context activity.
The definitional elements of the apology (identification of the wrongful
act, remorse, promise to forbear, and offer to repair) appear to require
low-context communication-that is, specific items that must be in-
cluded in the transmitted message. Thus, in order for the apologizer to
satisfy the elements of a full apology, he must transmit, and the apolo-
gizee must receive, certain expression and content: "I am sorry [remorse]
that I hit you with my bicycle [identification of the wrongful act]. I
would like to help with your medical bills [offer to repair]. I will be
more careful next time [promise to forbear]."
An apologizer's transmitted message that omits any of the above
definitional elements falls short of an effective apology. In the low-
context U.S. culture, the words, "I am sorry that I hurt you . . . ." might
begin a real apology, but such statements as, "I am sorry if you are hurt,"
or, "I am sorry that you are hurt," without more, fail. A recipient of the
message, "I am sorry if you are hurt," is likely to find the "if' term trou-
bling. 9 Such a phrase is a "conditional" apology.60 Likewise, the "I am
sorry that you are hurt" statement is often described as a "partial" apol-
ogy,6' since it expresses sympathy but does not satisfy the other requisite
elements.62
58. One example relates to non-verbal cues in communication, which are said to be
important in the apology act. See supra text accompanying note 42. Non-verbal cues are more
prominent in high- than low-context cultures. See Julie Barker, International Mediation-A
Better Alternative for the Resolution of Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotia-
tor Involved in an International Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMp. L.J. 1, 32 (1996) (citing Peter Andersen, Explaining Intercultural Differences in Non-
verbal Communication, in INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: A READER 286, 293 (Larry A.
Samovar & Richard E. Porter eds., 6th ed. 1992)); Jayne Seminare Docherty, Culture and
Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology for Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 711, 713 (2004).
59. Or more colloquially: "If? So you don't know if I'm hurt or not?" See John Leo,
I'm Terribly Sorry. Really, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 10, 2004, at 13 ("Secretary of
Education Rod Paige said to the National Education Association, 'If you took offense at any-
thing I said, please accept my apology.' If? He had said the NEA is a terrorist organization.").
60. Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, JUDICATURE, Jan./Feb. 2000,
at 180, 188 ("[A] conditional apology is no apology at all.")
61. E.g., Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1030; Cohen, Legislating Apology,
supra note 2, at 841.
62. Given the indications that a partial apology assists in the out-of-court settlement of
disputes, Jonathan Cohen advocates a legal system that would encourage parties to express
such apologies without fear that they would be used as evidence of an admission of liability.
See Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2. Cohen notes that an apology can be "value
creating." Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1015, 1016. Some apology purists object.
Chief among them is Lee Taft, who decries the "commodification" of the apology. See Taft,
supra note 30. Emphasizing the healing function of the apology as its primary purpose, Taft
urges that when one apologizes, she must bear all the consequences. Id. at 1156; see also
Lazare, supra note 30, at 43 ("A good apology.., has to make you suffer. You have to express
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Given the necessary components of the apology, one may wonder
whether its common definition is geared to the low-context culture.63 But
as O'Hara and Yarn note, context is "extremely important" because "an
abbreviated expression of apology can carry with it the implied presence
of unspoken elements." 6' This suggests that not all of the elements of the
apology need to be expressed in the transmitted message.65 If context
indeed is important in the apology setting, the apology might be one
activity in the low-context U.S. culture that entails both low- and high-
context communication. 66
The matter of the relationship between context communication and
the apology deserves more attention. Perhaps the cultural distinction of
low-/high-context has less impact on the apology than other cultural fac-
tors. Or perhaps an apology is one type of communication act where
high-context cultures can demand information in transmitted messages
genuine, soul-searching regret.... Unless you communicate guilt, anxiety, and shame, people
are going to question the depth of your remorse.").
63. Indeed, it should be noted that the leading definitions of apology are taken from
U.S. academic commentary. There is no indication therein that the definitions advanced have
universal application, or are tailored to a particular culture or cultures. One question is
whether the definitional requirements of the apology reflect the cultural orientation of the U.S.
commentators.
64. O'Hara & Yam, supra note 7, at 1139 (emphasis added). The authors also add, "but
other times it cannot." Id.
65. Yet for this to take place, that is, for the apology to be delivered and accepted
through preprogrammed information, both the apologizer and apologizee would have to be
from the same high-context culture. Without the commonality of culture, there could be disas-
trous consequences, including attributions of refusal to apologize and refusal to accept.
66. Conversely, in Japan, generally known as a high-context culture, written letters of
apologies, or shimatsusho, "a common and significant aspect of Japanese apology," indicate
low-context content, that is, specific definitional elements expressed in the transmitted mes-
sage. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 488. Wagatsuma and Rosett provide the following
example of shimatsusho by a high school student who took an unauthorized motorcycle ride:
On December 24, 1977, at 1:30 PM, I was found by a police officer while riding on
a motorcycle without a driver's license on P Street of Block D of City Z. I was
warned by the officer. I regret deeply what I have done and I pledge myself never
again to ride a motorcycle without obtaining a driver's license. Please deal with me
leniently this time.
Id. at 490. They also quote from a Japanese legal text that recommends the following shi-
matsusho in the hypothetical situation of a careless company employee:
I seriously regret that I have carelessly lost the company's check for 300,000 Yen on
such and such a day and caused my company serious trouble. Fortunately the check
has been recovered, but I am willing to pay for the expenses that might have been
incurred in the process of its recovery. I pledge myself never again to make such a
careless mistake and I would ask your generous forgiveness.
Id. (quoting JiYu KOKUMIN SHA 375 (1961)). It is important to note that the shimatsusho is a
written apology, and written transmissions are inherently more low-context than verbal ex-
changes. Wagatsuma and Rosett do not offer sample contents of verbal apologies in Japanese,
save for a brief phrase, sumimasen. See infra text accompanying notes 171-173.
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and low-context cultures can demand preprogrammed information in the
setting and the recipient. (But if that is so, the next question is to what
extent.) Or perhaps the apology act by its very nature depends so greatly
on the dynamic between the particular apologizer and apologizee and the
actions leading up to the apology setting that neat descriptions regarding
context are impossible.
The above examination of the apology under the low-/high-context
lens raises the question of whether the definitional elements and the pre-
sentational requirements of the apology are universal, culturally
dependent, or a combination of the two. The same query of universality
or cultural construction applies to other aspects of the apology, including
61its purpose, frequency of use, and relation to the legal system. With this
introduction of the apology and its relationship with culture in place, the
next section discusses the apology in the U.S. and Japanese cultures.
B. Apology: The U.S. -Japan Axis
When one is wronged by another, there is a human preference for an
apology.68 As alluded to above, differences in cultural norms may explain
why the apology resolves disputes more frequently in some national ju-
risdictions than in others. 69 The oft-cited article by Wagatsuma and
Rosett ° is still the leading work on this subject. This team of Japanese
anthropology and U.S. law commentators explains that the deeply in-
grained cultural regard for group harmony and hierarchy in Japanese
society shapes Japan's use of the apology. When one's actions have re-
sulted in another's injury, efforts are made toward accommodation and
compromise, and an apology is necessary to restore the "positive rela-
tionship '7' between the parties and acknowledge "the authority of the
hierarchical structure upon which social harmony is based. 72 Wagatsuma
and Rosett note that group harmony and hierarchy are of far less im-
portance in the United States, where the emphasis instead is on
individual autonomy.73 Thus, injury to another is less likely to result in
an apology and more likely to produce denial, justification,74 or "the
67. To give one example, it is said that one must apologize sincerely for the apology to
be effective. See ALTER, supra note 30, at 2; Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1017.
Yet Wagatsuma and Rosett point out that in Japan, sincerity is not so critical. Wagatsuma &
Rosett, supra note 1, at 472-73. This point is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying
notes 205-208.
68. See O'Hara & Yam, supra note 7, at 1122.
69. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 472.
72. Id. at 472-73.
73. Id. at 493.
74. Id. at 462.
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vigorous assertion of narrowly defined personal interests that will appear
in polar conflict with the rights of others. 75
Wagatsuma and Rosett's article continues to have influence in cul-
tural and comparative discussion of the apology, even as the authors
acknowledge that the evidence on which they relied was "incomplete
and anecdotal" 76 Ample commentary from a range of disciplines has
largely supported Wagatsuma and Rosett's premises and ultimate con-
clusion, namely that cultural norms explain the "real differences in the
incidence of apologetic behavior by Japanese and Americans faced with
a serious claim that they have injured another."77 For example, Professors
V. Lee Hamilton and Joseph Sanders8 closely echo Wagatsuma and Ro-
sett's observation of the Japanese emphasis on the group dynamic.
Hamilton and Sanders explain that Japanese society typically reflects a
social network combining hierarchy and solidarity,79 with individuals
existing "in a network of interlocked others."80 When disruptions or dis-
putes arise, an apology is necessary "to reinforce social harmony and
order in groups.""
Social science literature often characterizes the difference between
societal orientations to the group and to the individual (as discussed by
Wagatsuma and Rosett, and Hamilton and Sanders) as the collectiv-
ism/individualism dichotomy. 2 Professor Harry C. Triandis describes the
dichotomy as a construct to explain behaviors in different national socie-
ties.83 Intercultural expert Geert Hofstede identifies collectivism/
individualism as one of multiple cultural dimensions along which na-
tional societies differ to varying degrees8 4 A beginning definition of
collectivism is
a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see
themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-
workers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of,
and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give pri-
75. Id. at 493.
76. Id. at 464. Or as Professor Haley wrote, "we have only mined the surface lodes."
Haley, Implications of Apology, supra note 4, at 506.
77. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 464.
78. HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 7.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id. at 46; see id. at 138.
81. Id.; see Dean C. Barnlund & Miho Yoshioka, 14 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL RELA-
TIONS 193, 204 (1990) ("Harmony appears to be the most important value governing
interpersonal relations in Japan.").
82. Wagatsuma and Rosett did not refer to this term in their text.
83. TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 2.
84. GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS, SOFTWARE OF THE MIND:
INTERCULTURAL COOPERATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR SURVIVAL 13-14 (1997).
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ority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal
goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these
collectives.85
In contrast, individualism is
a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who
view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily mo-
tivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts
they have established with others; give priority to their personal
goals over the goals of others; and emphasize rational analyses
16
of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.
Hofstede's characterization of collectivist and individualist cultures
recalls Wagatsuma and Rosett's descriptions of the apology in Japanese
and U.S. societies, respectively. That is, the ultimate goals in collectivist
societies are "harmony and consensus," in contrast to the aim of "[s]elf-
actualization by every individual" in individualist societies.
87 In collec-
tivist societies, norms maintain harmony and avoid direct confrontations;
in individualist cultures, speaking one's mind is the norm.
8 (In addition,
collectivist cultures tend to employ high-context communication; indi-
vidualist cultures tend to be low-context.89) In Hofstede's survey and
rankings of 50 countries and three regions,9° the United States emerged
as the most individualist society, ranking first out of 53; Japan is signifi-
cantly more collectivist, in a tie for 22.9' Similarly, Triandis' text isolates
Japan (as well as China) as a classic case of collectivist culture on one
85. TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 2.
86. Id. Similarly, Hofstede defines the terms in this way:
Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose:
everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate fam-
ily. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth
onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout people's
lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
HOFSTEDE, supra note 84, at 51 (emphasis omitted).
87. Id. at 73, tbl. 3.4.
88. Id. at 67, tbl. 3.3; see TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 161.
89. HOFSTEDE, supra note 84, at 67 tbl. 3.3.
90. Hofstede has been described as "the 'father' of cross-cultural data bases" CHARLES
M. HAMPDEN-TURNER & FONs TROMPENAARS, BUILDING CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE:
How To CREATE WEALTH FROM CONFLICTING VALUES X (2000).
91. HOFSTEDE, supra note 84, at 53 tbl. 3.1. Of 53 states and regions studied, each state
was given an "individualism index" score within a range of 0 for the most collectivist to 100
for the most individualist. The United States captured the most individualist rank with an
index score of (91), edging out Australia (90), and Great Britain (89)-incidentally, all com-
mon law jurisdictions. Guatemala was the most collectivist, with an index score of 6. Id.
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end and the United States as the model individualist culture on the
other.92
In sum, the Japanese emphasis on harmony, hierarchy, and solidarity
of the group, as enunciated by Wagatsuma and Rosett and echoed by
Hamilton and Sanders, finds support under a different label from Trian-
dis (with Hofstede lending empirical support). An apology is expected
and given in Japan in deference to harmony in the collectivity.93 In con-
trast, the U.S. emphasis on the individual and the self 94 explains the
inclination against an apology stateside.95 Reflecting the U.S. social and
legal culture,96 when one's action results in another's injury, dialogue
occurs not in the form of an apology to the injured but through allegation
and denial by the parties or their counsel.97
92. TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 89, 97. About apologies specifically, Triandis states:
"East Asian collectivists use apologies as a social lubricant. Apologies are usually recipro-
cated, so that both parties 'take the blame.'" Id. at 155.
93. The desire for harmony is for the in-group, in contrast to harmony with out-groups.
Wagatsuma and Rosett distinguish between in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. Wa-
gatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 465. Similarly, Triandis notes that collectivists can act
individualistically when dealing with out-groups. TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at xiv. Elaborating,
"In collectivist cultures conflict is more likely to be intergroup, with ethnicity, language, relig-
ion, or race as the boundaries of conflicts. The conflict is between collectives...." Id. at I11.
94. Triandis sees in individualist societies an orientation toward achievement and ex-
treme competitiveness. TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 47, 180.
95. Commentators have weighed in on the U.S. disinclination to apologize and the
cultural forces that shape it. Apologizing is: "antithetical to the ever-pervasive values of win-
ning, success, and perfection," Lazare, supra note 30, at 40; and a "sign of weakness," id. at
78. (One is reminded of a line uttered by an icon in American film, John Wayne: "Never
apologize and never explain-it's a sign of weakness." BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
724 (16th ed. 1992) (attributed to Frank S. Nugent and Laurence Stallings for their screenplay
She Wore a Yellow Ribbon).) Taft explains that "strong values of autonomy and independence
... work against a tendency to apology," adding that such values might be more American
male values than American values. Taft, supra note 30, at 1142 & n.30. Another commentator
adds that the "high value placed on self-esteem and self-determination may make admissions
of failure more painful" and that "apologies, which seem to elevate the status of one partner
and demean the other, may conflict with an assumption of equality." Barnlund & Yoshioka,
supra note 81, at 204 ("[Slelf expression and spontaneity tend to be valued over the mainte-
nance of social harmony.").
96. Although the U.S. legal system as a whole has not yet developed a facilitating pur-
pose for the apology, a few states have enacted legislation that excludes apologies as evidence
of an admission of liability in medical malpractice cases. E.g., 2005 Ariz. ALS 184, 1 (Ari-
zona); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13.25 (2003) (Colorado); 2005 Ct. ALS 275, 9 (Connecticut);
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-37.1 (2005) (Georgia); Code Ann. § 10-920(b)(1) (2005) (Maryland); Mont.
Code Anno. § 26-1-814(1) (2005) (Montana); Wyo. ALS 1 (Wyoming). In addition, in some
states, statements or expressions of "benevolence" made at the death of a person are inadmis-
sible as evidence of liability. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1160; Fl. Statute § 90.4026; Tenn. Evid.
Rule 409.1 (2005); Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 5.66.010 (2005).
97. See Cohen, Legislating Apology, supra note 2, at 848, 850; Wagatsuma & Rosett,
supra note 1, at 472. Professor Cohen has elaborated on the matter of denial in the U.S. cul-
ture in a two-part work. Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903
(2005); Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEBRASKA L. REV. 247 (2005).
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A number of empirical studies supports Wagatsuma and Rosett's
view that the Japanese are more likely to apologize than Americans.
9
One study concluded that collectivist Japanese prefer mitigating ac-
counts9 such as apology and excuse, while individualist American
subjects prefer more assertive or aggressive accounts like justification
and denialU° Another study concluded that Japanese subjects prefer
more direct and extreme forms of apology, while Americans resort to
less direct and less extreme versions.' 1 Building on the above summary
of the apology and the contrasts between the Japanese and U.S. ap-
proaches, the next Part turns to the apology in the Korean setting.
II. KOREA
Toward an understanding of the apology in Korea, the task here is to
determine whether the cultural traits that shape the frequent use of the
apology in Japan are also present in its neighbor. Yet there is some dan-
ger in ascertaining a society's cultural traits statically or in isolation,
without a sense of its history. The study of any society is by its nature
complex, and the task requires some understanding of the society's con-
text. An exhaustive description is not possible here, but this Part provides
a brief summary of two competing aspects of the Korean setting that re-
late to the apology: first, the continuing presence of a traditional
Confucian culture, and second, developments in recent years indicating a
shift in social attitudes.
98. Hamilton & Hagiwara, supra note 25 (results based on survey questionnaires to 32
American and 25 Japanese students); Naomi Sugimoto, A Japan-U.S. Comparison of Apology
Styles, 24 COMM. RESEARCH 349 (1997) (results based on survey questionnaires to 200 U.S.
and 181 Japanese students). With respect to the form of the apology expression (and returning
to the theme of whether an apology must be expressed in low-context form or can be delivered
in high-context), the Hamilton and Hagiwara study used the same phrasing for subjects of
both countries, i.e., a plain, brief statement of "I'm so sorry." Hamilton & Hagiwara, supra
note 25, at 165, 171. The Sugimoto study found that similar "basic norms" of apology were
present in both cultures, that is, "(a) statements of remorse, (b) reparation, (c) compensation,
(d) promises not to repeat the same offense, and (e) requests for forgiveness." Sugimoto, su-
pra, at 359.
99. The term "accounts" is used in social psychology and relates generally to the attri-
bution of responsibility. The classification of accounts includes denial, justification,
consensus, excuse, and apology. See Hamilton & Hagiwara, supra note 25, at 157.
100. See Itoi, Ohbuchi & Fukuno, supra note 25.
101. See Barnlund & Yoshioka, supra note 81 (results of survey of 40 U.S. and Japanese
students in "semistructured interviews"). The study also noted that Japanese tend to apologize
without explaining their actions, adapting more to the status of the apologizee, while Ameri-
cans offered explanations to justify their actions and adapted less to the status of the
apologizee. Id. at 193, 203-04.
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A. Korea: The Traditional and Contemporary
Confucianism, originating in China, spread to other societies in the
region, including Japan'0 2 and Korea. Professor Sang Hyun Song has
written:
Confucianism has been the most persistent, persuasive and in-
fluential teaching in East Asian history. More than any other
thoughts, it has molded the minds and behavior of the people in
China, Korea, and Japan for many centuries. Confucianism has
provided these people with their ethical and moral norms as well
as suggested methods of government, and the impact of this
Confucian theory and its ideology upon their political and social
life is still discernible today.
0 3
In Korea, the founders of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910) adopted
a brand of Confucianism, or neo-Confucianism,'04 that "served as a blue-
print for ordering and integrating Korea's political and social life."'0 5
Some commentators have observed that over time, Korea became more
Confucian than the original model itself. ' According to one Confucian
scholar, Korea is more Confucian than its regional neighbors in various
respects, including "cultural orientation" and "social structure.'
0 7
Any discussion of Confucianism in Korea must address the question
of its continuing presence in the contemporary setting. One author, while
questioning the lasting effects of Confucianism on all aspects of Korean
society, nevertheless acknowledges "the residual strength" of Confucian-
ism in "interpersonal relations."'0 ' Another describes Confucian ethics in
102. See Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual
Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 37 (1994).
103. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA 43 (Sang Hyun Song
ed., 1983) (editor's note). See also Arthur Wineburg, Protecting Intellectual Property-A
Capital Asset, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN ASIA § 1.01, at 1-9 (Arthur Wine-
burg ed., 2d ed. 1999) ("Most Asian societies are influenced by the Confucian ethic.").
104. See THE RISE OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM IN KOREA (William Theodore de Bary &
JaHyun Kim Haboush eds., 1983); see also FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 88-89 (Andrea Matles Savada & William Shaw
eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY]; DENISE POTRZEBA LETT, IN PURSUIT OF
STATUS: THE MAKING OF SOUTH KOREA'S "NEW" URBAN MIDDLE CLASS 14 (1998).
105. LETT, supra note 104, at 14.
106. See DONALD STONE MACDONALD, THE KOREANS: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 32 (1990); ANDREW C. NAHM, KOREA, TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION: A HISTORY
OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE 95 (1988).
107. Tu Wei-ming, The Search for Roots in Industrial East Asia: The Case of the Confu-
cian Revival, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 740, 761 (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby
eds., 1991).
108. William Shaw, Rights, Culture, and Policy: The Prevailing Model, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (William Shaw ed., 1991).
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Korea as "still prevailing"' 9 and "still pervasive."" In a more recent
work, Professor Chaihark Hahm writes that "Confucian culture provides
the tools with which Koreans interpret and give order to the world
around them."" Yet these statements must also take into account the rap-
idly changing nature of social attitudes in Korea. Elaboration of this
point also requires some understanding of the political and societal de-
velopments in Korea in the past five decades.
After liberation from Japanese colonial rule at the close of the Sec-
ond World War in 1945, and withdrawal of the U.S. military government
a few years later, Korea emerged as an independent sovereign. Shortly
thereafter, a three-year war on the peninsula with communist North Ko-
rea devastated much of the country. The postwar years saw corruption
and ineffective rule in the government as well as public protest. A mili-
tary coup in 1961, led by army general Chung-Hee Park, began a reign
of authoritarian rule by military generals for over a quarter of a century.
After Park's assassination in October 1979 and months of political un-
certainty and turmoil, army general Doo-Hwan Chun seized power the
following year. His command of a brutal suppression of dissent in
Gwangju on May 18, 1980, still haunts the Korean mindset.1
2 Pro-
democracy demonstrations and protest against Chun intensified during
his reign"1 3 and ultimately ushered in the momentous democratization
Shaw points out that the decline of Confucianism as a "living political philosophy ... began
in the 1880s and sharply accelerated after the loss of Korean independence in 1910." Id.
109. Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press: South Korea and Japan Re-
examined, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 53,78 (1990).
110. Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 260 (1995) (quoting Kyu Ho Youm, The Libel Law of the Repub-
lic of Korea, 35 Gazette 183, 193 (1985)).
111. Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 253, 257 (2003). See id. at 271-72 ("[Cjonfucianism provides the people with the
signs, symbols, and strategies-the tools with which to negotiate the world around them.").
Confucianism is still described as the "centuries-old primer on social behavior." Sang-Hun
Choe, Marked Men in South Korea, CHI. TRtB., June 29, 2003, § 1, at 5.
Within this discussion, however, one is reminded of Professor Hahm's caution against
speaking of Confucianism on overly general terms: "Even within one country, we must be
mindful of the fact that Confucianism (at least certain aspects of Confucianism) is stronger or
more respected in some regions than others.... Also, discussions of Confucianism must be
issue-specific. The same Confucian influence can work in different ways depending on the
concrete issues." Hahm, supra, at 268. Korean society might reflect some Confucian norms
strictly and others less so.
112. Koreans refer to this event in their contemporary history as oh-il-pahl, or 5-1-8. For
texts devoted to the event, see LINDA S. LEWIS, LAYING CLAIM TO THE MEMORY OF MAY: A
LOOK BACK AT THE 1980 KWANGJU UPRISING (2002); CONTENTIOUS KWANGJU: THE MAY 18
UPRISING IN KOREA'S PAST AND PRESENT (Gi-Wook Shin & Kyung Moon Hwang eds., 2003);
THE KWANGJU UPRISING: EYEWITNESS PRESS ACCOUNTS OF KOREA'S TIANANMEN (Henry
Scott-Stokes & Jai Eui Lee eds., 2000).
113. For Chun's apology to his countrymen for various abuses of power, see infra note
180.
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reforms of 1987, "the year of the constitutional miracle,' 4 and the first
popular presidential election in Korea. During this political and societal
upheaval, Korea also underwent a transformation from a principally
agrarian society to the eleventh largest economy in the world. This rapid
economic growth improved the standard of living for many Koreans and
spurred the emergence of a growing middle class."5 Korea's arrival on
the world stage perhaps culminated in its hosting of the Summer Olym-
pic Games in 1988. Some observers claim that all of this-the political,
economic, and social developments-occurred while Korea adhered to
Confucian ethics."1
6
Along with profound reforms in its political institutions, govern-
ment, and law, as well as remarkable economic growth, Korea also saw
the beginning of changes in social attitudes and norms. A New York
Times report in 2003 captured a Korea in transition and underscored the
weight of its past and the directions of the present society: "Still an-
chored in Confucian values of family and patriarchy, South Korea is fast
becoming an open, Westernized society-with the world's highest con-
centration of Internet broadband users, a pop culture that has recently
been breaking taboos left and right, and living patterns increasingly fo-
cusing on individual satisfaction.""' 7 Indeed, sociologists note that the
changes in social attitudes and practices that have occurred in a matter of
years in Korea took decades in Japan and Western countries."" In the
opening years of the new century, Korea appears to be a society in trans-
formation."'
114. Tscholsu Kim & Sang Don Lee, The Influence of U.S. Constitutional Law Doctrines
in Korea, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 303, 322 (Law-
rence W. Beer ed., 1992); see James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional
Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN KOREA, supra note 108, at 222.
115. See LETT, supra note 104.
116. E.g., Gregory K. Ornatowski, Confucian Ethics and Economic Development: A
Study of the Adaptation of Confucian Values to Modern Japanese Economic Ideology and
Institutions, 25 J. SOclO-EcONOMICs 571, 587 (1996).
117. Norimitsu Onishi, Divorce in South Korea: Striking a New Attitude, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2003, at 19. The changing attitudes and practices relating to divorce provide one
example. A decade ago, "[flew Koreans divorced ... and deep social prejudice forced those
who did to resign themselves to a life of solitude." Today, "a surging divorce rate ... ranks
among the world's highest." Id. Koreans are also marrying later, reflecting "rising individual-
ism and shifting priorities from marriage to academic achievement and careers." Divorce
Surges Among Older Couples, KOREA TIMES, June 22, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
9888409.
118. Onishi, supra note 117, at 19.
119. Id.; see also Ok Kyung Yang, Family Structure and Relations, 62/63 Soc. INDICA-
TORS RES. 121 (Apr. 2003) (discussing decreasing family size, decreasing marriage rate,
increasing divorce rate, decreasing incidence of three-generation extended families, increasing
single-person households, and "liberal and flexible family environment in everyday life,"
despite notions of hierarchical Confucian influence).
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With this brief background on Korea's past and present and with an
eye to the future, the next section examines whether the cultural traits
shaping the apology in Japan-particularly the emphasis on group har-
mony and hierarchy-are present in the Korean setting.
B. Harmony, Hierarchy, Collectivism, Shaming
1. Harmony
The emphasis on group harmony and hierarchy in contemporary Ja-
pan is a byproduct of Confucianism, 20 which holds harmony and
stability in interpersonal relations as one of its central characteristics."'
With societal harmony in mind, litigation was to be avoided; 22 when a
dispute inevitably arose, its resolution came through conciliation.1
2
1
Commentators suggest that the profound influence of Confucian norms
has shaped the regard for harmony in contemporary Korean society as
well.
12 4
120. See RICHARD D. LEWIS, WHEN CULTURES COLLIDE: MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY
ACROSS CULTURES 81-83 (1999); FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR
JAPAN 1 (1987); Robert Benham & Ansley Boyd Barton, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Ancient Models Provide Modern Inspiration, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 629 (1996) (citing
Lynn Berat, The Role of Conciliation in the Japanese Legal System, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 125, 150 (1992) (now AM. U. INT'L L. REv.)); Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-
Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the International Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC.
RiM L. & POL'Y J. 59, 63 (1995).
121. See A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (Wing-Tsit Chan trans. and compl.,
1963) ("[Confucius'] primary concern was a good society based on good government and
harmonious human relations." For society in general, Confucius stressed "proper conduct or
li."); Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: "Med-Arb" and the Confluence of Culture and
Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 149, 163 (2004) (citing Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross-Cultural Negotiations, with A
Special Focus on ADR with the Chinese, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2000)) ("At
the heart of Confucius' teachings was the belief that harmony was to be achieved among per-
sons."). Confucius is credited with such statements as: "A gentleman is never contentious,"
THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 188 (William Edward Soothill trans., 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS], and "[r]epay an injury with straightness," THE ANALECTS 129
(D.C. Lau trans., 1979).
122. Wang Wenying, The Role of Conciliation in Resolving Disputes: A P.R.C. Perspec-
tive, 20 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 421, 421 n.3 (2005) (citing LiU SHUXIAN, UNDERSTANDING
CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY: CLASSICAL AND SUN-MING (1998)). The Master advised: "get the
people to avoid litigation altogether"; "[w]hat is necessary ... is to cause the people to have
no litigation"; and "surely the great thing is to bring about that there be no going to law." THE
ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS, supra note 121, at 584, 585. Statements attributed to Confucius
relating to the apology specifically remain elusive. Suggestive quotations include: "[w]hen in
the wrong, do not hesitate to amend," and "[s]ettle a dispute with half a sentence." Id. at 453,
582.
123. See Wenying, supra note 122, at 421 n.3.
124. See Youm, supra note 109, at 78; see also Jae-Jin Lee, Freedom of the Press and
Right of Reply Under the Contemporary Korean Libel Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 16
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 155, 191-92 (1998).
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In Korea, the Confucian virtue of seeking harmony and avoiding
litigation was traditionally followed with keen attention. As Professor
Pyong-Choon Hahm wrote:
Koreans have abhorred the black-and-white designation of one
party to a dispute as right and his opponent as wrong. Assigning
all blame to one for the sake of rendering a judgment has been
repugnant to the fundamental valuation of harmony, because
such a judgment has retarded swift restoration of broken har-
mony. The ultimate ideal has been a complete absence of dispute
and conflict. But if discord could not be avoided, society de-
manded the quickest restoration of broken concord. 125
A litigious man is a warlike man to the Koreans. He threatens
harmony and peace. He is a man to be detested. If a man cannot
achieve reconciliation through mediation and compromise, he
cannot be considered an acceptable member of the collectivity. 
26
The above statements, made in 1969, indicate a traditional Korean
view, but may well be outdated for a significant portion of the Korean
populace. Although some Koreans adhere to the traditional preference
for non-legal settlement over court adjudication, there has been a "dra-
matic change in the attitudes of the Korean people toward litigation."
1 27
Koreans are becoming more litigious, more willing to advance legal
claims, and more willing to resort to the courts. 2  Whereas
in the late 1960s, "[tihe vast majority of the population ... ha[d] never
been to a courthouse ... [and] were proud of that fact, ,129 a survey taken
in the 1990s shows that nearly 30 percent of respondents had "been to
court for 'legal problems'" and almost half "regard[ed] filing a suit for a
125. Pyong-Choon Hahm, The Decision Process in Korea, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR: CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND
WEST 19, 19-20 (Glendon Schubert & David J. Danelski eds., 1969) (footnote and citation
omitted), reprinted in PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CUL-
TURE 95-96 (1986).
126. Pyong-Choon Hahm, Religion and Law in Korea, in HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRU-
DENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE, supra note 125, at 152, 177.
127. Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence ofAmerican Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22
S. ILL. U. L.J. 71, 84 (1997).
128. Id.; Jeong-Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, in RECENT
TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 321, 323 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000);
Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
303,303 (1993).
129. Hahm, The Decision Process in Korea, supra note 125, at 22, reprinted in HAHM,
KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE, supra note 125, at 98.
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money matter as a means of achieving justice or as a method of exercis-
ing their rights." 3°
The commentary's references to skyrocketing lawsuits ' in Korea
and an emerging "litigious zeitgeist"'32 are clear evidence of change and
a departure from traditional norms. The trend seen in the past two dec-
ades squarely questions whether an aspect of Confucian ethics-the
distaste for, and avoidance of, litigation-has eroded.
2. Hierarchy
In Confucian teachings, harmonious relations require an ordered,
stable society and regard for hierarchical relationships.'33 These teach-
ings were also followed in Korea. In the Chosun dynasty, "cardinal rules
in maintaining social order" required "[a]cknowledging the authority of
the nation and family, and obedience of the common people to the king,
children to parents, wives to husbands, and the young to the 
elderly."'3"
The Chosun dynasty took hierarchy to some extremes, particularly with
its establishment of formal, legally separated classes within society. 35
130. Korean Legislation Research Inst., A Survey on the Korean People's Attitude To-
wards Law, in KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 128, 146 (Sang-Hyun Song ed. and
trans., 1996). A host of reasons are offered for the change in attitudes toward achieving results
through the courts. In addition to the democratization movement that began with reforms in
1987, other factors include the industrialization, globalization, and profound economic growth
Korea saw in the 1980s, which by their very nature exposed Koreans to international legal
standards and judicial methods to resolve commercial disputes. Related to economic prosper-
ity is the emergence of the Korean middle class, which enjoyed more material gains, and
therefore, a desire to protect proprietary interests, by court adjudication if necessary. One may
argue that such democratization reforms provided the impetus for a contemporary equality
movement.
131. Ahn, supra note 127, at 84 (citing Kyong Whan Ahn, The Growth of the Bar and
Changes in the Lawyer's Role, in TECHNOLOGY AND LAW IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 119,
133 (C. Lewis ed., 1994)).
132. Youm, supra note 110, at 260.
133. "Confucius identified five cardinal relationships that needed to be honored to
achieve a stable social order: father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder and
younger brother, and friend and friend." de Vera, supra note 121, at 163.
134. Tae-Rim Yoon, The Koreans, Their Culture and Personality, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE: COLLECTIVISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 18-19 (Gene Yoon & Sang-Chin
Choi eds., 1994); see also COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 104, at 89; DAVID I. STEINBERG, THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 93 (1989).
135. Beneath the king and the royal family, Korean society was formalized and stratified
into discrete classes, with the yangban, representing the ruling class and the societal elite, at
the very top, followed by, in descending order, joong-in (literally, "middle people"), sang-in
(the commoner class), and chun-min (literally, the "'low-born' or 'inferior people' "). See
ANDREW C. NAHM, INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 105--06 (1993);
NAHM, KOREA, TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION, supra note 106, at 100-01 (1988); see also
PYONG-CHOON HAHM, THE KOREAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND LAW 110 n.4 (1967); LETT,
supra note 104, at 17-20; Pyong-Choon Hahm, The Traditional Patterns of Authoritative
Symbols and the Judicial Process in Korea, in HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND
CULTURE, supra note 125, at 33 (adding another class of "outcasts" below chun-min); Byung
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Although Korea abolished the class system toward the end of the dy-
nasty years,'36 and the Korean Constitution explicitly prohibits it,137 the
residue of Confucian hierarchy persists in contemporary Korea.'38 Ko-
rean society continues to be deeply, perhaps rigidly, hierarchical.'39 In
interpersonal relations within the family, in school, in the workplace, and
in virtually any setting involving interaction with anyone other than mere
passersby, Koreans have a keen awareness of their status relative to that
of others.14
0
The emphasis on hierarchical relations within Korean society might
well explain the frequency of the apology in Korea relative to other so-
cieties. In a survey of multiple cultures, anthropologist Letitia Hickson
concluded that the apology "is an important dispute management
mechanism in societies ... in which hierarchical relationships and a hi-
erarchical ethos take precedence over egalitarian relationships.' 4 ' She
explains:
Ho Park, Social Castes and Legal Rights Under the Modem Korean Law, 4 KOREANA Q. 35
(1962).
136. This occurred in the social reforms of 1894, nearly two decades before Japanese
colonial rule began. See CARTER J. ECKERT ET AL., KOREA OLD AND NEW: A HISTORY 227
(1990).
137. S. KOREA CONST. art. 11 (2) ("No privileged caste shall be recognized or ever estab-
lished in any form.").
138. See MARK L. CLIFFORD, TROUBLED TIGER: BUSINESSMEN, BUREAUCRATS, AND
GENERALS IN SOUTH KOREA 10 (rev. ed. 1998).
139. E.g., id. Clifford notes:
Every aspect of Korean society is rigidly organized according to title, which often
reflects seniority. Behavior toward seniors is extremely deferential, and requires
special forms of speech, while that toward juniors can often be rough and crude.
Even among twins, the younger one typically defers to the older one and uses an
honorific form of speech.
Id. See also Yoon, The Koreans, Their Culture and Personality, supra note 134, at 18 ("Korean
society is vertical; hierarchy is very strong.").
140. See MACDONALD, supra note 106, at 80; Yoon, The Koreans, Their Culture and
Personality, supra note 134, at 18.
141. Hickson, supra note 28, at 285. Hickson explains that an apology is an "effective
dispute management mechanism" because it
offers the offender, by definition the lower-status individual in most cases, a means of
acknowledging both the moral and the structural superiority of the higher-status indi-
vidual, thus reversing the perceived wrong that is at the heart of the dispute. The moral
superiority of this individual is acknowledged and reaffirmed by the offender's con-
fessing and expressing regret for the offending actions thereby acknowledging the
wrongness of his/her position and the correctness of the offended's position.... The
structural superiority of the higher-status individual is acknowledged and reaffirmed
by the offender's requesting forgiveness thereby placing him/herself in the position of
the petitioner who is at the mercy of the petitionee.
Id. at 286 (citations omitted).
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In ... hierarchical societies, the prominence of apology reflects
... the tendency for disputes to be cast as challenges to one's
position in the status hierarchy, i.e., to one's reputation, and
hence for the goals of the offended individual to be the restora-
tion of his/her reputation ... or "good name" .... Because the
status of individuals in hierarchical societies ... tends to be
validated primarily by the respectful behavior of others (particu-
larly their inferiors) and only secondarily, if at all, by their
achievements or tangible assets, individuals are sensitive to be-
havior that is perceived as disrespectful and thus casts doubt on
their claim to this status. Moreover, disputes between unequals,
which compromise the bulk of disputes in hierarchical societies,
whatever their mundane, or concrete, focus of disagreements are
by definition challenges to the offended's status because they in-
volve the lower status individual's refusal to submit to a
superior. 1
42
Although Hickson resorted to the hierarchical setting in Fiji as a
frame of reference for the discussion, her reliance on the impact of hier-
archy generally could have equal application in Korea. Given Korea's
hierarchical nature, it is not surprising that Hickson found the country to
be one of a small number of societies in her sample that frequently
used14 1 the apology as a dispute resolution mechanism.'" Importantly,
Hickson conducted her study before 1987, when the dramatic democrati-
zation reforms and changes in social attitudes discussed above began.
Observations that contemporary Korea is a deeply hierarchical soci-
ety must therefore be further examined. A hierarchical society could
yield deep class consciousness with role expectations (which would en-
courage apologies), but the same class consciousness could also create a
divisive setting'14 with resentment from those in relatively lower classes
(which might discourage apologies). Regarding the latter case, a Korea
observer notes that the confrontation between social classes in Korea,
along with conflict between the country's provincial regions, has reached
142. Id. at 286.
143. That is, the apology was seen "as a particularly effective or appropriate method of
achieving reconciliation," or there were indications that the apology occurred more often than
"other means of reconciliation." Id. at 287.
144. Id. at 288 tbl.1. Hickson's survey included 56 societies, including Korea and Tai-
wan, but not Japan. For her study, Hickson defined apology "as the written or spoken
expression of one's regret, remorse, or sorrow for having wronged another individual." Id. at
287.
145. The results of the 2002 presidential election displayed clear rifts along generational
and regional lines in Korean society. See Peter Beck, Korea's Next President, 5 KOREA IN-
SIGHT 1 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.keia.org/2-Publications/2-1-Insight/Insight-
January03.pdf.
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"crisis" proportions.' 6 A more current study on the impact of hierarchy
on the apology would be beneficial given recent social change.
3. Korea's Collectivity
The cultural emphasis on the group and network of interlocked oth-
ers is a characteristic of a collectivist orientation. As noted above,
Hofstede's country rankings place the United States as the most indi-
vidualist and Japan as significantly more collective. 47 Viewing the
rankings from the most individualist countries at the top to the most col-
lectivist at the bottom, Japan, whose collectivist orientation has received
separate attention in other texts, remains in the top half of the list. In
contrast, Korea is in the bottom one-third. 148 According to Hofstede's
study then, Korea, even more than Japan, is a society where harmony
and consensus are ultimate goals,49 maintaining harmony and avoiding
direct confrontations is the governing norm,'50 and the nature of commu-
nications is typically high-context.'5 ' Perhaps not too much should be
made of rankings and indices in one study.'52 Nevertheless, other com-
mentators, including Triandis, have commented on the collectivist
146. South Korea: Roh Asked To Bring National Unity, Economic Stability, BERNAMA
MALAY. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 104453308. A media
correspondent had previously reported that disparity in classes had become "a social time
bomb that threatens the economic and political progress South Korea has made." Bob Deans,
Widening Gap Between Rich, Poor Threatens South Korean Progress: Despairing Workers
Turn to Violent "Self-Defense", ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 14, 1990, at A4.
147. HOFSTEDE, supra note 84, at 53, tbl.3.1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 73, tbl.3.4.
150. Id. at 73, tbl.3.3.
151. Id. at 67, tbl. 3.3.
152. Importantly, Hofstede's methods and conclusions have not been free from criticism.
The most sharply critical response is Brendan McSweeney, Hofstede's Model of National
Cultural Differences and Their Consequences: A Triumph of Faith-A Failure of Analysis, 55
HuM. REL. 89 (2002). Nevertheless, Hofstede's work continues to have influence in a number
of disciplines. See, e.g., JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: How To NEGOTIATE
DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 15-17
(2001); CARLEY H. DODD, DYNAMICS OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 90-92 (5th ed.
1998); ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAw-
YERs 911 (3d ed. 2002); SUSAN C. SCHNEIDER & JEAN-Louis BARSOUX, MANAGING ACROSS
CULTURES 87-91 (2d ed. 2003); Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMPL. L. 1, 10-14 (1997); Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path De-
pendencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 147, 170-71 (2001); Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating International Business Disputes, 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 465-66 (2004); Joseph Sanders et al., The Institutionaliza-
tion of Sanctions for Wrongdoing Inside Organizations: Public Judgments in Japan, Russia,
and the United States, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 871, 875-77, 888, 918 (1998); Daniel Visser,
Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 41, 71 (2003).
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leanings in Korean culture.'53 Yet, as with other indicators, one wonders,
in light of changing social norms, if the collectivist characterization so-
cial scientists attribute to Korea is still current. Does the growing regard
for "individual satisfaction ' ' 4 in Korean society reflect a trend toward a
relatively more individualist outlook?
4. Shaming in Korea
In addition to cultural norms emphasizing orientation to the group,
another societal trait that contributes to the frequent use of the apology
in Japan is shaming.' 5 Although Wagatsuma and Rosett did not sepa-
rately discuss the impact of shame,5 6 Japan is widely described as a
shaming society.' 7 In her classic text on Japanese culture, " Ruth Bene-
dict notes that "[tihe primacy of shame [haji] in Japanese life means...
153. One consultant in human resources reports that collectivism in Korea explains why
many Koreans consider the workplace their second family. Ames Gross, Human Resources
Issues in the "ligers" of Asia: Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, 6 INT'L
HUM RES. J. 18 (1997). In his text, Triandis refers to a 1994 study indicating the extent of the
collectivist orientation in the Korean workplace:
47 percent of Korean firms send condolences to employees whose grandparents
died. No less than 79 percent congratulate employees when their children marry.
Even school admission of an employee's child is cause for congratulation (15 per-
cent of the finns); 31 percent congratulate employees for the birthday of one of
their parents-in-law. No less than 40 percent send condolences for the death of a
parent-in-law.
TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 3.
154. Onishi, supra note 117, at 19.
155. There is continuing discussion on the (purported) distinction between shaming and
guilt cultures. See, e.g., Bailey Kuklin, "You Should Have Known Better", 48 U. KAN. L. REV.
545, 560 n. 48 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 943 n. 151 (1996); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?,
107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1081 & n.125 (1998).
156. The authors made only a brief reference. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 493
(quoting DAVID BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER: POLICE BEHAVIOR IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 150 (1976)) ("An American accused by a policeman in [sic] very likely to respond
'Why me?' A Japanese more often says 'I'm sorry.' The American shows anger, the Japanese
shame.").
157. Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT'L & Covu'. L. REV. 1,
55, 75 (2005) ("culture of shame that pervades Japan"; "Strong culture of shame"); Toni M.
Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1906-10
(1991) (presenting Japan as having a shame culture); Anne-Marie McAlinden, The Use of
"Shame" with Sexual Offenders, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 373 (2005) ("classic shame cul-
ture"). Indeed, shame may be "one of Japan's defining societal traits." Jeff Vize, Torture,
Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human Rights Abuses in the Japanese Penal
System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329, 372-73 (2003) (discussing RUTH BENEDICT, THE
CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD 222-27 (1946)).
158. RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (New American Library
ed. 1974).
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that any man watches the judgment of the public upon his deeds," 9 and
shame is "a thing bitterly felt.'''6 Thus, if there is a societal expectation
that one apologize after causing injury to another, one will do so, for "[a]
failure to follow .. . explicit signposts of good behavior ... is a
shame.' 161 Shame will result in judgment and loss of virtue.162
Korea too has been described as a shaming culture. Professors
Sungeun Yang and Paul C. Rosenblatt offer a focused examination of
shame in Korean society.' 63 They note that shame is "valued and encour-
aged in Korean society" and is "of central importance in the functioning
of individuals and families."'T6 Perhaps indicating that a trait attributed to
Japan applies in Korea more extremely, Yang and Rosenblatt state that
Korea is a society "where people are supposed to feel shame very fre-
quently."' 65 In such a setting, shame is "a taken for granted part of life,
like rush hour highway traffic."' 66 They explain that one who has done
something shameful has a strong duty to express regret, and suggest that
those to whom the regret is expressed have a duty to acknowledge and
accept it. 67 It is not clear whether Yang and Rosenblatt's observations on
159. Id. at 224.
160. Id. at 106.
161. Id. at 224.
162. Id. For a discussion of shaming and restorative justice in Japan, see JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 61-65 (1989); ELIZA AHMED ET AL.,
SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington
eds., 2001); John Braithwaite & Declan Roche, Responsibility and Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 63
(Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiffeds., 2001).
163. Sungeun Yang & Paul C. Rosenblatt, Shame in Korean Families, 32 J. COMP. FAM-
ILY STUD. 361 (2001).
164. Id. at 365.
165. Id. at 369.
166. Id. The traffic congestion in Seoul is legendary.
167. As an aside, President Moo-Hyun Roh's eventual apology provides an introductory
illustration of the use of the apology in Korea, in light of social and cultural norms. The Na-
tional Assembly impeached Roh in March 2004 in a politically charged event. One of the
grounds for impeachment was Roh's violation of an election law that prohibited public offi-
cials from speaking in favor of a political party. Roh did not deny that his partisan comments
in support of a party were a technical violation of the law. Opposition leaders demanded that
he apologize, and, one may argue, the shaming culture required that he do so. Shaming, it is
said, is a vehicle for restoring order when a wrong has been committed, even at the highest
level of society. Roh's steadfast refusal to apologize could be seen as contrary to the shaming
protocol. The failure to express regret for the shameful act required drastic action, which led
to the unprecedented impeachment. Newspaper reports suggested that Roh brought the im-
peachment onto himself by refusing to apologize. See, e.g., Joo Sang-min, Opposition Insists
Enough Votes To Impeach, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 12, 2004; Andrew Ward, Roh Stance In-
creases Opposition Pressure, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at 11; Michael A. Lev, S. Korea
Leader's Fate in Hands of Court That Can Annul Ouster, CHI. TRiB., Mar. 13, 2004, at C4.
Roh was reinstated by the Constitutional Court, his powers were fully restored, and he was
politically vindicated. But restoring the equilibrium also required that Roh apologize, even if
belatedly, which he did. It must be emphasized that the case of the Roh apology was set in the
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the expression of "regret" after committing a shameful act apply neatly
to an apology, although the potential for overlap is obvious. Also uncer-
tain is whether the impact of shame in Korean society as described by
Yang and Rosenblatt remains steady or has changed in recent years.
5. Summary of Cultural Indicators
Due to Japan's emphasis on group harmony and hierarchy, which is
fueled by its collectivist orientation, the Japanese frequently see the
apology as necessary to redress the situation of another's injury. Japan's
shaming society also demands the apology. With respect to the presence
of these cultural traits in Korean society, two somewhat contrary obser-
vations can be made. First, there are indications that Korea meets and
even surpasses the Japanese emphasis on harmony, hierarchy, and collec-
tivism. Korea is a highly Confucian country, a society with deeply-
rooted values of harmony and recognition of distinctions within the hier-
archy. Moreover, Korea is as collectivist as Japan, if not more so. Korea
too has a shaming culture, which can work to encourage apologies.
These considerations alone would allow one to conclude that in Korea,
like Japan, the apology is frequently used to facilitate the resolution of
disputes; perhaps Korea could replace Japan in the apology literature as
"the apologetic society par excellence."
68
This would be a hasty conclusion, however, in light of the second
observation-that Korean society is undergoing significant change in
attitudes and practices and may well be in "the throes of a social trans-
formation."' 69 With a trend indicating departure from at least one
traditional Confucian norm (relating to the avoidance of litigation), it is
not clear whether the cultural traits relating to harmony, hierarchy, col-
lectivism, and shaming will work to encourage apologies, as in Japan, or
whether their impact has significantly declined society-wide, resulting in
less frequent apologies.
All of this calls for further examination of the current use of the
apology toward dispute settlement in Korea. Given the nature of Korean
society, the research should take into account differences in the use of the
apology based on indicators that Koreans still employ to distinguish them-
selves, including regional origin, social status, and age. In anticipation of
such studies, this Article provides, in addition to background on the
arena of domestic politics, perhaps a rarefied area of Korean life that does not typify disputes
between ordinary citizens. Although cultural norms may allow a subtle apology, made indi-
rectly or with non-verbal communication, Roh did not have such a luxury. Opposition leaders
demanded a full, formal apology for its shaming, and perhaps punitive, effect. Yet such an
apology is not commonly seen in Korea. See Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 163, at 370.
168. TAvUCHIS, supra note 31, at 37.
169. Onishi, supra note 117.
Fall 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
Korean cultural landscape and contemporary developments, an introduc-
tion to the apology in a practical setting. The next Part begins with the
question of how one apologizes in Korea(n).
III. KOREAN APOLOGY, KOREAN LAW
This Part addresses the relationship between law and apology in Ko-
rea in three sections. The first section discusses how an apology is
expressed in Korea and sheds light on the relevant terms in Korean and
the methods of delivery. This section is more introductory than exhaus-
tive. The second section addresses the treatment by Korean legal
institutions-the practicing bar and the courts---of the apology in dispute
settlement situations, bearing in mind the contrasts with the United
States and Japan in the same area. The first two sections rely in part on a
small sample survey of practitioners and judges that provides prelimi-
nary, anecdotal evidence. The third section focuses on the matter of the
legality of a court-ordered apology and offers a comparative analysis
using the Japanese and U.S. approaches as frames of reference.
A. Sah-gwah [Apology]
In all societies, the apology is in some part a function of communi-
cative expression, a "speech-act set."'' 70 Yet understanding the apology in
another culture is not merely an act of translation. The process of apolo-
gizing in Japan illustrates the complexity of the apology message. 7' As
Wagatsuma and Rosett explain, in Japan one may apologize after doing
"substantial physical, economic, social, or psychic harm to another" by
using the term sumimasen,17 but the very same term also applies to situa-
tions when an American would say "thank you."'73 The following
170. Olshtain & Cohen, supra note 27, at 18.
171. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 473.
172. Id. at 461-62.
173. Id. at 473. Even in this instance, the authors explain, "the core meaning of sumi-
masen is closer to 'I am sorry,' and its literal meaning is something like 'it will never end,'
suggesting recognition of a limitless obligation." Id. To elaborate:
Sumimasen is used when an individual receives a minor gift or favor ... to which
the recipient may at least semiconsciously feel entitled because she is a social supe-
rior or because she was once a benefactor, or simply because it is such a small
favor. It is less used to convey great gratitude than to express a mixture of gratitude
and guilt about receiving a favor.
Id. at 474. Cultural norms "demand that an individual should feel guilty about receiving a
favor or gift and therefore respond 'I am sorry' or 'sumimasen' rather than more directly ex-.
pressing one's appreciation with 'thank you' or 'arigato."' Id. at 474-75.
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examination of the apology in the Korean context reveals its own com-
plexities.
The Korean term for apology is sah-gwah'74 It is the general term
Koreans use when an apology is seen as necessary-for example, when a
school teacher orders a child to apologize to a classmate whom she has
hurt, when a politician demands an apology from another,'75 or when Ko-
reans demanded that President Bush apologize for the deaths of school
girls resulting from a U.S. military exercise. 176 A more formal term for
apology is sah-jweh.'77 Although sah-gwah and sah-jweh refer to an
apology or to the act of apologizing, they are not necessarily used by an
apologizer to apologize, at least in everyday verbal dialogue.' Similarly,
in the United States, one need not necessarily utter "apology" or
174. MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1073 (3d ed. 1998) (defining
sah-gwah as "an apology ... apologize"). Cross-cultural linguists will point out that the first
character of sah-gwah, "sah," is derived from the Chinese character meaning "confess faults;"
the second character "gwah" is derived from the Chinese character meaning "pass, cross over."
BRUCE K. GRANT, A GUIDE TO KOREAN CHARACTERS: READING AND WRITING HANGUL AND
HANJA 307, 250 (2d rev. ed. 1982). This could be read as reflecting a cultural view that to
apologize means more than saying the right words, but implies a significant shift in mindset.
The Korean term sah-gwah can also mean "an apple." MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra, at 1073. This coincidence led to an amusing (perhaps juvenile) culmina-
tion in a spat between politicians. Representatives of the Hahn-nah-rah party apparently
demanded an apology from a politician whose disclosure led to a scandal relating to evasion
of compulsory military service. In response, the politician sent a 5 kilogram box containing
apples to the headquarters of the Hahn-nah-rah party. A sign attached to the box read, "You
are eager to receive sah-gwah. So I give you sah-gwah. Please accept sah-gwah." A party
spokesman described the event as ridiculous and stated that if it occurred again, the recipients
would consider the apples to be poisoned and take appropriate action. See Kim Dae Uhb-ssi
myung-eui sah-gwa-sahng-jah Park Keun Heh deung-eh beh-dahl-dweh [Boxes of Apples
Delivered in the Name of Kim Dae-Uhb to Leader of Hahn-nah-rah Party, Park Keun Heh],
DIGITIAL CHOSUN ILBO, May 19, 2005, available at http://english.chosun.com/
w2 Idata/html/news/200505/200505190175.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
175. See supra note 16.
176. The author observed signs reading "Boo-shi [Bush] sah-gwah" in public places in
Seoul in December 2002.
177. MINJUNG ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 174, at 1098 (defin-
ing sah-jweh as "apology ... apologize ... beg... pardon [forgiveness]; make an apology;
express one's regret ... acknowledge one's fault"). One professional English-Korean inter-
preter offered the following on the distinction between sah-gwah and sah-jweh: sah-gwah "is
simply an apology, usually for some minor offence"; sah-jweh "means literally an apology for
a sin" and is used for a "major offence," such as "ruining somebody's life, killing someone,"
or the like. E-mail from Hyun K. Kim, Esq. to author (Aug. 2, 2005, 17:17 CST) (copy on file
with author).
178. In one instance, representatives of a company used the sah-jweh term to apologize
for creating a controversial database on various entertainment personalities based in part on
rumor and gossip. The apology statement appeared in newspapers and began with the title,
"We deeply apologize [sah-jweh .... I." See Jeh-il-gee-hwek, Yeon-yeh-in X File Sah-gwah-
gwang-goh geh-jeh [Jeh-il Communications, Apology Notice Publication for Entertainers' X
File], NAVER NEWS, Jan. 21, 2005 [hereinafter Jeh-il-gee-hwek], available at
http://news.naver.com/news/read.php?mode=LSD&officeid=l 17&articleid=0000002449&s
ectionid=106&menuid= 106 (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
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"apologize" to give a full apology, but may instead begin with "I am
sorry ... ." The Korean equivalent for saying "sorry" includes the root
terms mi-ahn179 orjweh-song,0 with the latter term generally being more
formal."'
The Korean term for expressing regret is yoo-gahm.'12 If the task is
to canvas the terms and expressions used to indicate (what is thought of
as) an apology, phrases with the rootjahl-moht must also be included. In
179. MINJUNG'S ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 174, at 865 (defin-
ing mi-ahn as "be regrettable; regretted; sorry regret; apologize").
180. Id. at 1995 (defining jweh-song-hah-dah as "regret; feeling sorry ... be sorry; re-
gret"). This is the phrase former President Chun used in his apology to the nation when ousted
from power in 1987. With public anger mounting against him, and facing demands for his
accountability, Chun went on nationwide television, bowed deeply, and apologized profusely
for corruption, human rights abuses, and other actions: "I am so sorry for making such a prob-
lem at the time all citizens do their best to make a bright future. I am the person who should
be responsible for any wrongs of executive branch made during the period I was president.
Citizens, I am truly sorry." CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 24, 1988, at 4. Chun also promised to return
riches he amassed while in office and announced a self-imposed exile in a Buddhist monas-
tery. Perhaps, too, Chun's apology is an example of a situation where an apology is not
enough. After his momentous address to the nation, questions remained as to Chun's sincerity,
and there were suspicions that he kept hidden a substantial amount of money taken from
bribes and extortion. Chun's apology did not spare him from what followed eight years later-
arrest, Korea's "trial of the century," conviction, and a death sentence, which was subsequently
reduced to life imprisonment and then a full pardon. Use and Abuse of Asian History: South
Korea's President Stumbles into Another Political Mess, FIN. TIMES USA, Aug. 23, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 9787532.
181. The Korean language has distinct informal (bahn-mahl) and formal (john-deh-
mahl) usages, to be used depending in part on the relative status of the conversants. In some
cases, a word may be expressed in the formal way merely be adding an honorific suffix. In
other cases, an entirely different word must be used. Regarding expression of sorrow, mi-ahn
can be expressed both informally and formally, whereas jweh-song can be used only in the
formal context.
182. MINJUNG'S ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 174, at 1685 (defin-
ing yoo-gahm as "regrettableness; lamentableness; deplorableness; pity; unsatisfactoriness"). On
the practical use of the term, a professional interpreter observes:
The word yoo-gahm is used in two different contexts: (1) when you express regret
for something that is not necessarily your fault but more of a product of a situation
(e.g., "I regret that your son and my daughter did not end up marrying each other.
How wonderful would it have been had they fallen in love!"); and (2) when you
want to express something "short" of an apology because you don't want to admit
to your fault or because you believe you didn't do anything wrong but still want to
appease the listener ....
E-mail from Kim, supra note 177. She also notes that yoo-gahm is the resulting Korean trans-
lation for Japanese diplomats' expressions of apology for events relating to the military
occupation. Id.
When President Bush reportedly called President Dae-Jung Kim to apologize for the
deaths of the school girls in a military training exercise, the Korean media reported that he
expressed "geep-eun yeh-doh-wah yoo-gahm," that is, "deep sadness and regret." See Boo-shi,
Kim Dae-tong-nyung-eh jun-hwa "Yeo-Joong-seng sah-mah" jik-juhb sah-gwah [Bush Calls
President Kim for Direct Apology for Deaths of Schools Girls], CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 14, 2002,
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the noun form, the term means "a fault; a mistake; an error; a slip; a
blunder; a failure; a wrong; a blame"; in its verb form, jahl-moht means
"do wrong; be in the wrong; make a mistake [an error]; blunder."'' 83 If the
heart of the apology is admitting a mistake, or having done something
wrong,'4 the Korean jahl-moht captures in one phrase the essence of the
apology. An admission of a mistake or wronging might be implicit in an
apology using the root terms mi-ahn orjweh-song, butjahl-moht is more
direct and unambiguous.
A review of the terms in the Korean apology language is impor-
tant,8 5 of course, but an understanding of local practice is also critical.
Several of the author's Korean acquaintances, professionals with signifi-
cant experiences in both the United States and Korea, observe that
Koreans do not usually apologize, at least not in the way that Americans
do (when they do at all).'8 6 A few note that even if one is sorry for caus-
ing injury or harm to another, he is likely to assume the injured party
already knows he is sorry (mi-ahn or jweh-song) and offer, in a case in-
volving an injury to the person, a thoughtful comment such as "Are you
okay?" Although such a characterization derives from personal observa-
tions and experiences and not from empirical data, it underscores that
understanding the Korean apology requires an appreciation of everyday
practice and customs in addition to translation.
7
183. MINJUNG'S ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 174, at 1848.
184. See supra text accompanying note 32.
185. Nuances of expression in the Korean language also present challenges. To give one
example, one may say "I am sorry" by saying, in the formal voice, "mi-ahn hahm-nee-dah."
But one may choose to say "mi-ahn-hah-geh-dweh-ut-sseum-nee-dah" (also in the formal
tense). Both expressions include mi-ahn, and both are stated in the formal tense, but the for-
mer is a more causative statement, while the latter, ending with the "-hah-geh-dweh-ut-sseum-
nee-dah" suffix, is more passive. See YONSEI UNIVERSITY KOREAN LANGUAGE SCHOOL,
HAHN-GUK-UH 2 201 (1994). Translation into English is difficult and the results read some-
what awkwardly. The phrase "mi-ahn-hah-geh-dweh-ut-sseum-nee-dah" could be translated as
"I came to be sorry," "I have become sorry," "It comes about that I am sorry," "It turns out that
I am sorry," or "Things work out in such a way that I am sorry'" See id. The problem is that for
the hearer, such a translation is likely to invoke questions of whether the statement is an apol-
ogy.
186. Interestingly, one explained, "It's just not in our culture"; another said, "We are
living in a different cultural background from that of the U.S." In this regard, one law profes-
sor in Korea explained to the author that Koreans do not normally apologize because
apologizing is contrary tojah-john-shim, one's self-respect.
187. Nor is translation always a simple task. The author requested professional English-
Korean interpreters to translate the full apology used in Professor Robbennolt's survey. The
apology read in relevant part: "I am so sorry that you were hurt. The accident was all my
fault." Robbennolt, supra note 45, at 484 n.112. One interpreter translated this phrase using
the term jweh-song for "I am so sorry" and chek-im (meaning "responsibility; liability...
answerability; accountability...," MINJUNG's ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
supra note 174, at 2084) for "all my fault." Another interpreter preferred yoo-gahm and jahl-
moht, respectively.
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The limited commentary on the subject of the apology activity in
Korea sheds some light on its role in the practical setting and tends to
support the anecdotal observations noted above. Yang and Rosenblatt,
whose work focused on shame, point out that a formal apology is rare in
Korea. 18 They explain that Koreans resort to various other ways to ex-
press regret for shameful acts, including indirect and nonverbal means,89
which are more likely to be acceptable in a high-context communication
culture like Korea. Another commentator specifically emphasizes the
importance of context communications in Korea, explaining:
We communicate through our eyes, which we call
"NUNCHI."['90] In contrast with North American culture, we do
not give credit to the direct expressions. This can be possible in a
mono culture and language .... For more understanding in Ko-
rean culture, we rely on the context of our environment, and do
not need to describe in detail. In contrast with Korean culture,
people in low-context need to spell out in detail in order not to
become obscure in the conversation.' 9'
The above commentary suggests that when one apologizes in Korea, she
will rarely state the multiple components of the common definition of
apology explicitly; 9 2 rather, Koreans are more likely to apologize with
words plus context. Research in the social sciences testing this hypothe-
sis would be informative.
188. Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 163. The apology by former President Chun was
rare indeed. See supra note 180. Another example of the rare formal apology was seen when
Jeh-il Communications, an advertising agency, acknowledged secretly creating a rumor-based
database on individual performers and entertainers. Representatives of the company ran a
published apology in newspapers, stating, "We ... offer our sincere apologies with our heads
lowered to all the entertainers, reporters and others involved .... Jeh-il-gee-hwek, supra note
178.
189. Yang & Rosenblatt, supra note 163. For example,
Sometimes people can cushion themselves from the shame of being blamed by oth-
ers. For example, when a person says, "Ijiock-pal-yau (I feel shame)," it usually is
said with a small laugh or smile. It mitigates the tension or seriousness of the situa-
tion and implies asking forgiveness from others. Then people tend to forgive the
person because the person has shown that he or she acknowledges acting in a way
that was not okay.
Id. at 370.
190. The term nun-chi is defined as "tact; sense; social sense; perceptiveness; an eye for
social situations." MINJUNG's ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 174, at
463.
191. Kwon, supra note 12.
192. If this is true, then a Korean person would not likely apologize by saying, as in the
example given above, "I am sorry [remorse] that I hit you with my bicycle [identification of
the wrongful act]. I would like to help with your medical bills [offer to repair]. I will be more
careful next time [promise to forbear]."
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Toward an understanding of the use of the apology in the resolution
of a dispute involving legal claims and rights, this author conducted a
survey of a small sample of legal professionals in Korea-nine attorneys
and seven judges-with experience in representing clients in civil litiga-
tion or presiding over such cases, respectively. Participants answered
questions relating to the expression of the apology and its role in dispute
settlement and were encouraged to give specific examples. 193 Given the
sample size, the results are more suggestive than representative, more
anecdotal than empirical. Nevertheless, the survey offers practical exam-
ples of how an apology is made in the settlement of legal claims.
Importantly, one must bear in mind that the participants in the survey
were not the private parties in dispute, but rather, the attorneys retained
or the judges before whom the submitted cases were pending. In other
words, when a party made an apology, the legal process had already be-
gun.
Some responses from attorneys offered thoughts on the meaning of
an apology and referred to one or more of the components seen in its
common definition, including admission of fault, promise of forbear-
ance, and offer of compensation. Other responses specifically stated
that the apology must be sincere. With respect to the specific wording
or expression of the apology, the sampling reveals that parties apolo-• 195 •196
gize (sah-gwah'94) with the terms mi-ahn,'9 jahl-moht, yoo-gahm, or a
combination of the three.
97
193. Participants were contacted by e-mail and provided a list of brief questions. Nearly
half of the participants responded in English, the remainder in Korean. Follow-up correspon-
dence occurred with some participants. All participants were assured confidentiality. All
correspondence is on file with the author.
194. The reporting participants referred to the sah-gwah term to characterize what was
expressed in a number of cases, but in only one case did a party actually say "I apologize" by
using the sah-gwah form. In that case, which occurred in a rural part of Korea, an elderly man
made a personal loan to someone several years his junior. The lender's requests for repayment
went unheeded, which led to a lawsuit. The lender was particularly upset that the borrower
refused to acknowledge the existence of the loan and continued to ignore the lender's requests
for repayment. Before the court, the borrower acknowledged his mistake (jahl-moht) and
apologized (sah-gwah-deu-rim-nee-dah) using the formal voice with the honorific suffix. The
borrower accepted the apology reluctantly and forgave the interest.
195. One judge reported a case involving an injury as a result of a snowboarding acci-
dent. The defendant stated that, after knowing all the circumstances, he was wrong (jahl-moht)
and was sorry (mi-ahn).
196. In this case, the president of a company alleged that management of a competing
company made false accusations of criminal conduct by his business. The parties entered into
a settlement agreement, in which the defendant expressed regret (yoo-gahm) for the plaintiff's
losses. The plaintiff took the statement as an apology.
197. In another case, the phrase nwe-ooh-chi-dah was used, meaning "repent... regret;
be sorry ... ; be penitent ... ; suffer remorse." MINJUNG'S ESSENCE KOREAN-ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY, supra note 174, at 464. The case involved a wrongful discharge claim by an
employee who was terminated after abusive language and behavior at the employer's company
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B. Apology and the Legal Institutions
In the Korean jurisdiction, no law or court rule explicitly addresses
the admissibility or consideration of an apology in the adjudication of a
claim. On questions of evidence (as well as procedure), judges are gov-
erned by the Civil Procedure Act,'"8 which allows them great discretion
in resolving questions of relevance and hearsay, among others.'99 With no
jury trials, the judge determines all questions of admissibility and suffi-
ciency. As in Japan, Korean courts reflect a judge-oriented, inquisitive
system, in contrast to the lawyer-oriented, adversarial system seen in the
United States .
The judges' survey responses are informative. One judge stated ex-
plicitly that Korean courts have long recognized the apology's significant
role in facilitating reconciliation and settlement and avoiding litigation. 0 '
Others stated that courts do not use an apology to the disadvantage of the
apologizing party. But this was not a unanimous view. A few judges,
while acknowledging that an apology is not an admission of liability,
also observed that it could still be used as evidence against the apolo-
gizer. For example, one judge stated that an out of court apology "is
commonly admitted as evidence to presume a certain fault."202
Some of the attorneys in the survey reiterated the view that although
an apology is not necessarily an admission of fault or liability, it could
be considered as evidence unfavorable or adverse to the apologizer.
Counsel who hold such concerns report that they have discouraged cli-
ents from apologizing to opposing parties. In contrast, other practitioners
report that they have advised clients to apologize in certain situations.
Their reasons for doing so reveal a wide range of motivations. Some at-
torneys explained that they advised an apology to restore "face," reduce
the other party's anger, calm heated passions, and ease settlement nego-
tiations; others found an apology helpful in persuading the opposing
picnic. The parties agreed to a settlement in which the employee: would be reinstated, not be
disciplined for the behavior at the picnic, agreed to follow the employer's rules in the future,
and expressed deep regret (nwe-ooh-chi-dah) for his behavior at the picnic.
198. See Civil Procedure Act, pt. 1, ch. III (Evidence) (as amended by Act No. 6626, Jan.
26, 2002), translated in 3 STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 391, 451-68 (Korean Legis-
lation Research Institute ed., 1997).
199. See Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 585, 601-
04 (1997).
200. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA 528 (Sang Hyun
Song ed., 1983). One judge in the survey taken by the author, see supra note 193, related that
the judge-oriented system results in some judges taking on an active role in persuading parties
to reach settlement, in which the judge's activities might appear to be those of a mediator.
201. Another judge stated that apology plays a great role in dispute resolution, especially
in small claims cases, which involve amounts under $20,000 in value.
202. This was a response in English.
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party to reduce the claim or to withdraw the lawsuit altogether (espe-
cially in defamation cases). For the former group, the apology might
have been inspired by the traditional Confucian desire for harmony and
conciliation. The responses of the latter set suggest that attorneys are
aware of the apology as one of several tools available for promoting a
more favorable result in litigation. Perhaps this development reflects the
Korean awareness of the same "commodification" of the apology decried
203by one U.S. commentator.
The sampling of responses from the Korean bench and bar described
herein indicates that with respect to the apology in dispute settlement,
Korea encounters aspects of both the Japanese and U.S. experience. As
in Japan, some Korean judges recognize the apology as an important
aspect of dispute resolution and do not legalistically use an apology
against the apologizer as unfavorable evidence. Yet as in the United
States, some counsel in Korea are fearful that a court may consider an
apology as evidence of fault and discourage their clients from apologiz-
ing. For parties who have actually given an apology, the motivations for
doing so reflect, on the one hand, regard for conciliation over litigation
in the event of a dispute, and on the other, recognition of the apology as
a strategic commodity in litigation.
C. The Court-Ordered Apology
The rather narrow and rarefied field of international "apology law"
must include the subject of the court-ordered apology. Preliminarily,
there is serious doubt as to whether an apology made pursuant to an or-
der of a legal authority is a true apology at all, since it is not voluntarily
made. In the practical setting, such an apology would result in the apolo-
gizer saying she has done something wrong when she does not believe
she has done so, or saying that she is sorry when she is not. Simply put,
the problem is whether an ordered apology could be a sincere one.2° As
noted above, sincerity is a core presentational requirement for an effec-
tive apology. °5 Yet perhaps the sincerity requirement is more important
in the U.S. setting, or the importance and meaning of sincerity are cul-
turally constructed. Wagatsuma and Rosett note that "what is considered
a sincere apology is not the same in the two societies.' 2° In the United
203. Taft, supra note 30. One practitioner even suggested a phrasing of an apology that
will not have legal consequences: "I regret [yoo-gahm] that we have arrived at this situation,"
similar to the American, "I'm sorry that this happened."
204. "[T]he more an apology is coerced, the less meaning it carries, for the less sincere
is the regret it expresses." Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1018.
205. See supra text accompanying note 35. Considering the American culture, making a
compelled apology would be "personally degrading." Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 462.
206. Id. at 461.
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States, the sincerity requirement must satisfy the societal preoccupation
with the "problematics of wholeheartedness, 207 while the Japanese are
more likely "to accept the external act of apology at face value and not to
disturb the superficial concord by challenging the sincerity of the person
apologizing." 208 Some of the survey responses indicate that the Korean
approach with respect to sincerity is more like that seen in the United
States than Japan.' °9
A culture's emphasis on individual sincerity in the apology act is
only one factor influencing its resort to a compelled apology. There
might also be legal (i.e., constitutional) limitations on the authority of a
court to order such a remedy. The next discussion addresses these points
for Japan, the United States, and Korea.
1. Japan
The cultural expectation of the apology (coupled with a relaxed re-
quirement of sincerity) might make Japan a setting where apologies,
more than being expected, are compelled by a proper authority. Wa-
gatsuma and Rosett observe that law enforcement officials in Japan can
and do obtain written apologies for transgressions from citizens (which
are then filed away, with no serious consequence for the transgressor).20
A more coercive atmosphere appears in Professor John 0. Haley's ex-
ample of two American criminal defendants who maintained their
innocence, failed to apologize to the court, and received maximum sen-
tences." ' Whether the defendants were guilty or not seems beside the
207. Id. at 473.
208. Id. at 472-73. In a similar light, given that Japan is a collectivist, rather than indi-
vidualist society, "when a collectivist apologizes, it is only a social form, not to be taken
literally." TRIANDIS, supra note 14, at 155-56.
209. Perhaps the different approaches to sincerity would explain why, with respect to
Japan's apology to Korea relating to the military occupation, many Koreans believe that Japan
has not fully apologized, whereas many Japanese believe that they have already apologized on
multiple occasions. See supra note 20.
210. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 489.
211. Professor Haley's full account:
A Japanese attorney recently related to my law class at the University of Washing-
ton his experience in defending two American servicemen accused of raping a
Japanese woman. She had charged the two with the crime in an affidavit to the
prosecutor, but then left Japan with a third U.S. soldier. The affidavit was the sole
basis of prosecution. The attorney advised the two defendants first to obtain a letter
from the woman stating that she had been fully compensated and had absolved
them completely. As advised the accused paid her 1,000 dollars and obtained the
letter. The lawyer then argued that to convict the accused solely on the basis of the
affidavit constituted an unconstitutional denial of a fair trial since they had no op-
portunity to cross-examine the witness. After listening attentively to the argument,
the judge leaned forward and asked the soldiers if they had anything to say, "We are
not guilty, your honor," was the immediate reply. The lawyer cringed. Although few
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point in the story. Once the defendants were in a situation where an
apology was expected, their "options" were to apologize and receive le-
niency or not apologize and face the maximum sentence.
Extending the discussion, the question here is whether the sociocul-
tural regard for, and expectation of, an apology could compel a Japanese
court to order an apology from a party who refuses to apologize volun-
tarily. Japanese law authorizes courts to order an apology, usually by
publication in a newspaper, as part of the relief granted in cases involv-
ing defamation (to restore the plaintiff's reputation)" 2 and intellectual
property infringement (to restore a business's good will).
2 3 Some com-
mentators note that although a court-ordered apology is permissible in
certain types of cases, and parties often request it, it is not usually em-
ployed, and courts are reluctant to issue it.214 One judge in Japan
indicated to this author that courts seldom order an apology, even in
defamation cases.
Japanese attorneys are as knowledgeable as he about American law, it had not even
occurred to him that the defendants might not offer apologies. The time and money
spent on the letter were wasted. The judge sentenced the two soldiers to the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment, not suspended. More telling, Japanese students need
only hear what the servicemen said to the judge to react. They know what happened
next. Only Americans have to be told.
John Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 265, 272 (1982), quoted in Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 1, at 462-63.
212. Civil Code art. 723. See Ryuichi Yamakawa, We've Only Just Begun: The Law of
Sexual Harassment in Japan, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 523 (1999); see also Max
Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 545, 558 (2000) (citing Masao Horibe, Press Law in Japan, in PRESS LAW IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 330 (1985)).
213. Unfair Competition Prevention Law, art. 7; Patent Law, art. 106; Copyright Law,
arts. 115, 116; Trademark Law, art. 39. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Pat-
ent Protection in Japan: A Half-Century of Progress, A New Millennium of Challenges, 16
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71 (2002) (citing Holly Emrick Svetz, Japan's New Trade Secret Law: We
Asked For It: Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 413, 434-35
(1992); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.
887, 968 n.417 (1988)).
214. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual Property Law in Translation: Rep-
resentative Cases and Commentary, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 847, 854 (2001); Scott K.
Dinwiddie, A Shifting Barrier? Difficulties Obtaining Patent Infringement Damages in Japan,
70 WASH. L. REv. 833, 848 n.76 (1995) (citing DIGEST OF JAPANESE COURT DECISIONS IN
PATENTABILITY AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 1966-1968 80 (Yukuzo Yamasaki ed. and
trans., 1970)). One example of a court declining to order an apology involved an action
brought against the Japanese government by three Korean women who were forced to serve as
"comfort women" for Japanese soldiers during the war years. The court awarded damages to
the plaintiffs but denied their request for an official apology. For an English translation of the
Japanese court decision, see Taihei Okada, The "Comfort Women" Case: Judgment of April
27, 1998, Shimonoseki Branch, Yamaguchi Prefectural Court, Japan, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 63 (1999).
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The Supreme Court of Japan upheld the legality of court-ordered
apologies in defamation cases in Oguri v. Kageyama.25 The court ruled
that such a remedy does not violate the freedoms of speech, expres-• 21627
sion, thought, or conscience as provided for in the Japanese
Constitution. In Oguri, the defendant, a candidate for elective office,
stated in public speeches that the plaintiff, his opponent, had received a
bribe in connection with a government contract. The trial court found in
favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to publish a letter of
apology in local newspapers and issue radio broadcasts." ' A majority of
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, with only brief discussion of
the constitutional challenges. The majority's reference to the freedom of
speech or expression did not indicate an implicit freedom of silence. In-
stead, the only mention of freedom of expression in the opinion
215. Jap. Sup. Ct., July 4, 1956. An English translation of the opinion is available in
JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECI-
SIONS, 1948-60 47 (1964). The case is discussed in Kazuomi Ouchi, Defamation and
Constitutional Freedoms in Japan, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1962), and Youm, South Korea and
Japan Reexamined, supra note 109, at 68-70.
216. JAPAN CONST. art. 21 ("Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech,
press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.").
217. Id. art. 19 ("Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.").
218. An English translation of the apology that the defendant was ordered to sign and
publish reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Kageyama:
I confess that I committed a great sin by injuring your honor by broadcasting, as an
official candidate of the Japan Communist Party for the electorate of Tokushima
Prefecture, three defamatory speeches for five minute periods on the radio Toku-
shima, respectively, at 9:20 p.m., Sept. 21, at 9:30 p.m., Sept. 25, and at 9:20 p.m.,
Sept. 27. In those speeches, I said with no reliable sources that 'you received a
commission amounting to Y8,000,000 for purchasing a generator for the Sakasu
Power Plant while you were in the office of Deputy Governor of the prefecture.'
Mr. Goro Abe later published an open letter in The Tokushima Press on the twenty-
ninth of the same month where he elaborately disclosed the tre circumstances
when the generator was purchased and declared that it was not only illegal but im-
moral to impair other's reputation by spreading false informations, providing me an
opportunity to apologize. However, on the contrary, I went further by publishing an
open letter in the same paper, saying, 'No matter how hard you may try to defend
yourself, it is impossible to deny the fact that you received the bribe of V8,000,000.
Why have you not said a single word to justify yourself, while the Communist Party
has kept accusing you of this for nearly three months?'
I feel deeply ashamed of myself and apologize to you for what I have done to your
reputation and for causing annoyance to you and to many others by making such
speeches and subsequently publishing distorted facts in the newspaper.
Kiyomi Oguri
Ouchi, supra note 215, at 74. It is difficult to imagine a court ordering such an apology in the
United States, or an individual apologizing in this manner.
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concerned whether such freedom protected the defendant's right to make
the defamatory statements.1 9 With regard to other constitutional chal-
lenges, the majority acknowledged that violation of the freedom of
conscience was one of the grounds for appeal, but offered no further
elaboration. 20 The majority instead quoted the provision of the Civil
Code under which the trial court ordered the apology,22 noted that the
ordering of a publication of apology under the statute "has been ap-
proved by past theory and precedent," and declared that newspapers have
previously complied with such court orders. 222 Three concurring opinions
directly addressed the freedom of conscience, one explaining that the
right refers to freedom of religion or faith, which was not applicable to
221
the case. Two justices dissented, urging that the freedom of conscience
prohibits court-ordered apologies.224 Justice Fujita wrote that "forcing
someone ... to announce to the outside world against his real feelings
his judgment concerning the rightness or wrongness, or goodness or evil
of things, and to order him to utter an apology that he did not really feel,
is truly a violation of the ... freedom of conscience. 225 In brief, a court-
ordered apology is not inconsistent with Japan's constitution; Japanese
law allows for it in certain types of cases, although it appears to be an
infrequent remedy.
2. The United States
In the United States, courts have expressed an aversion to compelled
apologies due to practical as well as constitutional considerations. Some
courts have indicated that due to the very nature of an apology, it should
not come at the behest of a court judgment. An oft-quoted opinion by
Justice Pomeroy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explains why a
court-ordered apology is misguided. In Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Association,226 the court invali-
dated a decision by the state human rights commission ordering a
cemetery to send a public apology to a woman for refusing to bury the
remains of her husband because of his race. The majority of the court did
not address the apology specifically. In a separate concurring opinion,
219. MAKI, supra note 215, at 48. The court described the argument as "groundless" and
noted that "publication of baseless facts" is an abuse of the freedom of expression. Id.
220. Id. at 49.
221. "If a person has injured the reputation of another, the Court [may require] the for-
mer to take suitable measures for the restoration of the latter's reputation." Id. (quoting Civil
Code art. 723).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 52 (Tanaka, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 62 (Fujita, J., dissenting), 63-64 (Tarumi, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 62-63 (Fujita, J., dissenting).
226. 306 A.2d 881 (1973).
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Justice Pomeroy wrote that because an apology is "a communication of
the emotion of remorse for one's past acts," it is "beyond the reach of
any government," and indeed is tyranny "[t]o order up that particular
emotion."22 7 If the ordering authority desires "only the outward act" of a
"public manifestation of remorse" and is indifferent to actual remorse, he
explained, "then it would be either extracting a lie from those willing to
lie ('I'm sorry', but I'm really not) or asking the courts of this State to
hold in contempt those who will not lie ('I'm not sorry and I will not say
th a t I a m ). 
'
221
As an aside, a cross-cultural analysis of the Pomeroy opinion may
help explain why a court-ordered apology finds support in Japan and
general scorn stateside. Wagatsuma and Rosett indicate that in Japan, the
external or outward act of an apology is sufficient, with the Japanese
treating with some indifference the apologizer's actual remorse or
wholeheartedness in the expression of remorse. The public act is all that
is necessary to restore harmony and recognize the hierarchical order of
the collectivity. In the United States, however, an apology is more fo-
cused on the relative wants of the individual, who upon being injured by
another, demands a sincere expression of the remorse emotion. This, Jus-
tice Pomeroy urged, is not something a court of law should order.
Differences in judicial approaches to court-ordered apologies may there-
fore hinge on the relative importance a society places on sincerity.
With concerns similar to those expressed by Justice Pomeroy, a fed-
eral appeals court, in an unpublished decision,229 saw as an abuse of
discretion the district court's ordering the defendant employer to apologize
to the plaintiff employee for the defendant's "reprehensible" conduct.
230
The purpose of the forced apology, the appeals court reasoned, was to
right a moral wrong; "[t]he law, however, is not usually concerned with
procuring apologies to make morally right a legal wrong done to the plain-
tiff.,,
23
Courts in a number of decisions have rejected requests for an apology,
reflecting judicial reluctance, if not hostility, to the institutionalization of
227. Id. at 890 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
228. Id. Justice Pomeroy wrote, "Given the choice, I would rather hold in contempt the
former, not the latter. But in my view the Commission should eschew purporting to order the
expression of an emotion, whether or not the emotion is in fact entertained by the one so or-
dered." Id.
229. Rule 28(g) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Rules restricts citation
of the case to limited situations. 6th Cir. R. 28(g).
230. Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 Fed. Appx. 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court
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the apology.2 2 In some cases, courts have exhibited a heavy-handed dis-
dain for the apology request and function.33 In the extreme, they have
displayed an excessive show of disapproval.2 Yet even with knowledge of
such decisions and an understanding that court-ordered apologies are un-
constitutional, parties in litigation have not been dissuaded from
requesting the court to order an apology. This is perhaps a testament to the
strong desire for the emotional healing that an apology, more than mone-
tary compensation, can deliver. In many of these cases, courts have
232. See Frederic v. Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, No. 92-0592, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1809, at *57-58 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994) (stating law provides for remedy, not apology); City
of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1976) ("The writing of [a letter of
apology] is calculated to humiliate and debase its writer and will succeed in producing only
his resentment--an emotion not particularly conducive to the advancement of human rights.");
Nelson v. Nelson, Nos. A-02-252, A-02-512, 2003 Neb. App. LEXIS 87, at *24 (Neb. Ct. App.
Apr. 8, 2003) ("[P]unishment by way of imposing upon her an indignity and embarrass-
ment."), aft'd, 674 N.W.3d 473 (Neb. 2004); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Lieber, 277
N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) ("[A]n apology ... [is] neither appropriate nor desir-
able."); see also In re King, 568 N.E.2d 588, 611 (Mass. 1991) ("We decline to order a public
apology [by the judge] as we do not consider such a sanction particularly appropriate or effec-
tive in this type of case."); State ex rel. Martin v. Pendergast, 81 P. 324, 325 (Wash. 1905)
(finding that the court exceeds authority when it demands an apology from an attorney).
233. See Lieber, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (describing apology as "nothing more than a use-
less, vain and meaningless gesture").
234. In McKee v. Turner, 491 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff attorney alleged
that an assistant U.S. attorney made defamatory remarks in a letter to the chief judge of a
federal district court and sought $150,000 in damages. The district court dismissed the action,
based on the ground that the defendant's letter was within the scope of his duties, relying on
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). The matter of the plaintiff's desire for an apology sur-
faced, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, when "[a]t the opening of his oral arguments in our
court, counsel for McKee, in the presence of McKee, began with a statement that the plaintiff
wanted no money from Turner-he just wanted an apology from Turner. He closed with the
same statement." McKee, 491 F.2d at 1107. The court of appeals' opinion will likely be in-
cluded in any text on the judicial treatment of the apology. The court began its opinion, "This
is much to do about nothing, but we must do it," id. at 1106, and followed with the statement,
"We are not commissioned to run around getting apologies' id. at 1107, which has proven
quotable. Then the court added, "However, to McKee we apologize for Turner," not under-
standing what an apology is or why the plaintiff requested it. Id.
235. See Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1018. The First Amendment limita-
tions against a court-ordered apology are discussed infra text accompanying notes 243-248.
236. In some cases, a party desires only an apology, and the lack of an apology prompts
the lawsuit. This presents a vicious circle. The injured person would not sue if she received an
apology. The injurer morally might wish to apologize but does not do so on advice of counsel,
fearing negative legal consequences. Thus the lack of an apology results in a lawsuit, with
demands for injunctive and monetary relief. See O'Hara & Yam, supra note 7, at 1122-24.
One Korean attorney in the survey stated that the purpose of some lawsuits in defamation
cases is to obtain an apology from the defendant in exchange for an agreement to withdraw
the suit. Perhaps the extreme case is when a plaintiff declares on the record that she wishes
only an apology and no damages, as counsel did on appeal in McKee, 491 E 2d at 1106. The
candor proved fatal, with the court ruling that the plaintiff "completely vitiated the prayer of
his complaint. We, therefore, hold that McKee's case is de minimis ... and does not present a
justiciable controversy." Id. at 1107.
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ignored the apology request or denied it without comment. In others,
courts have refused to order an apology because it was not authorized by
the statute under which relief was sought.238 Yet there is a small but sig-
nificant number of cases where the trial court ordered an apology with
no (reported) challenge or objection from the apologizer-to-be.2 9 It
should be noted that many cases in this group fit within one of two cate-
gories--defendants in criminal actions ordered to apologize to the
240 241victim 24° and attorneys ordered to apologize for misconduct, persons
not best situated to challenge the apology order.4 2
237. See Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp.2d 542, 551
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Pearson v. Ind. High School Athletic Ass'n, IP 99-1857-C-T/G, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10501 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 22, 2000); Hernandez v. U.S. Fam. Ct., No. 96 Civ. 0035
(HB), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13620 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1996); Pirie v. First Congregational
Church, No. 90-2891-B, 1993 Mass. Super. LEXIS 2 (Mass. Dec. 20, 1993); see also Wil-
liams v. Individual Justices of the Sup. Jud. Ct. of Maine, 245 F. Supp. 2d 221, 229 (D. Me.
2003); Lee v. ITT Standard, 268 F. Supp. 2d 315, 354 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Reidy v. Maryland,
259 A.2d 66, 67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
238. See Bimbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 321, 335 (2d Cir. 1978) (an apology
requested for the government opening mail; the apology was not available under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b), which stipulates money damages); Gray v. UAW Local 12 Jeep, No. 3:02CV7618,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5877, at *5-7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2004) (an apology requested from
a union for discrimination; the apology was not available under ADA); City of Minneapolis v.
Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 205 (Minn. 1976) (an apology requested because of unfair dis-
criminatory practices by police; the apology was not available under Minn. St. 1971,
§ 363.071(2)); Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d at 889 (an apology requested be-
cause of race-based discrimination in denying burial in cemetery; the apology was not
available under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); see also Virgin Islands v. Bryan, No.
1989-129, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20855, at *2 (V.I. Feb. 20, 1990) (an apology requested
from opposing counsel on behalf of client; the apology was not available under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927); Illinois v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1361-62 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (a published apol-
ogy in a newspaper requested for driving under influence of alcohol; the apology was not
available under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,ch. 38, §5-6-3.1).
239. E.g., Desjardins v. Van Buren Cmty. Hosp., 969 E2d 1280, 1282 (1st Cir. 1992)
(per curiam). The case is discussed further infra note 248.
240. See T.J. v. State, 619 So.2d 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Whitfield, 827
So.2d 1196 (La. Ct. App. 2002); In re M.S.J.O., No. CX-96-5, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 635
(Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 1996); State v. Lobato, 611 N.W.2d 101 (Neb. 2000); In re Steven
C., 2004 Ohio 6313 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); In re Kemper, No. 93CA15, 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 619 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1994); State v. Schempp, 498 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 1993);
State v. Matthew D.B., 617 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Ogden, 530 N.W.2d 70
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The inclusion of an apology in sentencing has also received media atten-
tion. E.g., Amanda Garrett, Apologize or Go To Jail, Judge Orders Criminals to Say, "I'm
Sorry," to Victims, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 9, 1999, at 1B; Haya El Nasser,
Paying for Crime with Shame, Judges Say "Scarlet Letter" Angle Works, USA TODAY, June
25, 1996, at IA.
241. See United States v. Elder, 300 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2002); Krim v. Banctexas Group,
Inc., 99 F.3d 775 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Gooch, 250 B.R. 887 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000); In re
Swan, 833 E Supp. 794 (C.D. Cal. 1993); In re Baroldi, 189 Cal. App.3d 101,(Cal Ct. App.
1987); Princell v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 298 (Ill. Ct. App. 1931); In re
Kraushaar, 907 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1995); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Estiverne, 512 So.2d 417
(La. 1987); In re Castellano, 566 P.2d 1152 (N.M. 1977); State v. Storms, 311 A.2d 567 (R.I.
1973).
242. A notable exception is the persistent and unyielding efforts of the attorney in In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). In that case, an attorney was directed to appear at a show cause
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Courts considering an ordered apology must also address the more
glaring constitutional limitations of such a remedy.243 A court-ordered
apology triggers First Amendment concerns because the practical result is
that the defendant is ordered to "speak in a manner that may well contra-
vene the beliefs the defendant holds."2" The Supreme Court has reaffirmed
its view that the right to free speech includes the right not to speak.245 Per-
haps due to the simplicity of the question, there is a surprisingly small
number of cases in which a court refers to the First Amendment to deny a
request for a court-ordered apology. One example is a Virginia state deci-
sion in which the trial court declined to order the plaintiff's counsel to
apologize, as requested by the defendant and his lawyer, tersely stating,
"First Amendment concerns preclude the Court from ordering the apol-
ogy.'24 6 In another case, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld a state
human rights commission decision ordering a restaurant owner to apolo-
gize to an employee for offensive remarks; voicing his strong objections,
a dissenting judge wrote:
As to the written apology, in my view the First Amendment pro-
tects both the right to speak and the right to remain silent. Just as
the First Amendment permits recovery of money damages for li-
belous speech, it permits the State to protect an employee
against the offensive and humiliating speech of his employer. It
may not, however, require the employer to apologize any more
hearing to determine why he should not be suspended from practice as a result of a letter that
he wrote to a judge's secretary. At the hearing before the court of appeals, the attorney de-
clined multiple opportunities to apologize for the disrespectful tone of his letter. "I cannot, and
will never, in justice to my conscience apologize for what I consider to be telling the truth,
albeit in harsh terms," he stated. Id. at 640. For his refusal to apologize, the attorney was sus-
pended from the practice of law in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for six
months. The en banc court stayed the order of suspension for ten days, to be lifted if the attor-
ney apologized, which he again declined to do. The Supreme Court reversed. "[E]ven
assuming that the letter exhibited an unlawyer-like rudeness, a single incident of rudeness or
lack of professional courtesy-in this context-does not support a finding of contemptuous or
contumacious conduct." Id. at 647. Deciding the case on that ground, the Court determined
that there was no occasion to reach the attorney's constitutional arguments, including his as-
sertion that the First Amendment protected the letter. The Court did not address the
constitutionality of a court-ordered apology.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In criminal actions, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination would also work to bar a compelled apology. For an (unpublished) decision
in which a court held that the Fifth Amendment precludes an apology even after a guilty ver-
dict, see State of Wisconsin v. Maupin, No. 94-1198-CR (Wisc. App. Nov. 4, 1994).
244. Woodruff, 29 Fed. Appx. at 337.
245. "The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on
the voluntary public expression of ideas. ... There is necessarily ... a concomitant freedom
not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its
affirmative aspect." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 296 N.Y.S.2d
771, 776, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
246. Griffith v. Smith, 30 Va. Cir. 250 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993).
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than it could require that school children recite the pledge of al-
legiance ... unless it can be shown that such an enforcement
device is essential to the constitutionally permissible purpose of
the law. No such showing has been made here.247
To date, the above declarations from state court decisions appear to
comprise the U.S. position on the First Amendment's prohibition of a
court-ordered apology. 4 1 Ultimately, in a jurisdiction where the legal
system is generally undeveloped with respect to the use of apology in
dispute settlement, it is no surprise to see a request for court-ordered
apology rejected when pitted against the venerable right of free speech.
3. Korea, Comparatively
Korea is a jurisdiction where the courts of a constitutional democ-
racy have been in operation for less than two decades. The body of
decisional law is not as full as those of jurisdictions in the West; the Ko-
rean judiciary (as well as Korean jurisprudence) is still seeking its own
identity. Yet with respect to the issue of the permissibility of a court-
ordered apology, the court of last resort on questions of constitutional
law249 has spoken in a full, elaborate opinion. Ultimately siding with the
247. In re Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525, 529
(1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting in part).
248. A decision by the federal courts on the question appears to be elusive. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit experienced a near miss in an employment discrimina-
tion case, where the district court ordered, in favor of the plaintiff, damages, attorney fees and
costs, and a public apology in a local newspaper. Desjardins v. Van Buren Comm. Hosp., 969
F.2d 1280, 1281 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam). On appeal, the defendant argued that the order of
a public apology violates the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to
address the issue, since it was not raised in the district court and therefore waived. Id.
249. The Korean judiciary includes the Constitutional Court, as well as the Supreme
Court of Korea. The Korean Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of Korea is "the
highest court of the State." S. KOREA CONST. art. 101(2). The Constitutional Court was estab-
lished by constitutional amendment in 1987. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over
1. The constitutionality of a law upon the request of the courts;
2. Impeachment;
3. Dissolution of a political party;
4. Competence disputes between State agencies, between State agencies and
local governments, and between local governments; and
5. Constitutional complaint as prescribed by Act.
Id. art. 111(1). For a discussion of the origins of the Constitutional Court, its failed predeces-
sors, and its outlook in the opening years, see DAE-KYu YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 168-70 (1990); James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Consti-
tutional Court of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex?, 40
AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990). A more recent work that discusses the court's work in its first 15
years and the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court is avail-
able in TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
IN ASIAN CASES 206-46 (2003).
[Vol. 27:1
The Law and Culture of the Apology
U.S. position, the Constitutional Court determined in 1991 that a court-
ordered apology is contrary to the Korean Constitution.2 0
The case arose when a former Miss Korea brought an action against
Dong-A-Ilbo (a major newspaper), its president, and chief editor for al-
legedly defaming her in an article. The plaintiff sought, in addition to
compensatory damages, a publication of an apology in a newspaper un-
der Section 764 of the Civil Code, which provides that in a defamation
action a court may order "suitable measures" against the responsible
party in order to restore a victim's reputation. Previously, Korean
courts had ordered apologies in defamation cases where damages could
not restore the plaintiff's reputation. 252 The defendants' motion chal-
lenged the constitutionality of any interpretation of Section 764 that
would allow the court to order a party to apologize; the district court de-
nied the motion. The defendants then filed a direct petition to the
Constitutional Court.
253
In a unanimous decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that Section
764 was unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed a court to order a
publication of apology (sah-jweh),2 5 as such an interpretation violated
the freedom of conscience, a fundamental right guaranteed by the Ko-
rean Constitution.25  The court explained that as used in Article 19 of the
Constitution, "conscience" refers to "a world view, a life view, an ideol-
ogy, a belief and ... value[] or ethical judgments in inner thoughts
250. 89 Hun-Mah 160 (Apr. 1, 1991), 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149, avail-
able at http://152.99.78.12:7778/jsp/homepage/xmtcontent view.jsp?view=&xml= 150398&
category--0103&page=&keyword=89-I'160&query=&user id=. An English summary of the
case is included in CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE Ko-
REAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 138-40 (2001) [hereinafter Notice of Apology Case], which
is available on the court's Internet site at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/English/
download/decision_10years.pdf. Citation to the text of the actual opinion herein will be to
89 Hun-Mah 160, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149. Reference to the English
summary of the case will be to Notice of Apology Case. The case is discussed in Youm,
supra note 110, at 253-55, and Kyu Ho Youm, Press Freedom and Judicial Review in South
Korea, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-28 (1994).
251. Civil Act § 764 ("Special Rules which Govern in a case where of Defamation").
The provision reads in full: "The court may, on the application of the injured party, order the
person who has impaired another's fame to take suitable measures to restore the injured
party's fame, either in lieu of, or together with damages." Civil Act, translated in 3 STATUTES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, supra note 198, at 135.
252. 89 Hun-Mah 160, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149.
253. The Constitutional Court Act permits such a petition.
254. "Publication of apology" is a translation for the Korean phrase that appears in the
opinion, sah-jweh gwang-goh, literally meaning, "apology advertisement." The phrase has
also been translated as "notice of apology." See Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250. In the
text of the opinion, in addition to the phrase, sah-jweh gwang-goh, the court also uses sah-
gwah and sah-jweh to refer to the apology generally. 89 Hun-Mah 160, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT DECISIONS 149, 152, 154, 155, 156.
255. S. KOREA CONST. art. 19 ("All citizens shall enjoy freedom of conscience.").
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affecting one's formation of personality. 25 6 Freedom of conscience, then,
protects against governmental intervention with people's judgment of
what is right and wrong.2 57 The court further commented that freedom of
conscience also refers to freedom of silence, which protects people from
being compelled by the government "into making ethical judgments pub-
lic. '258 A court-ordered publication of apology violates the freedom of
conscience in that it compels a personal judgment that one's behavior
amounted to unlawful conduct. It disrupts a person's dignity259 and "dis-
torts his conscience and forces a dual personality upon him by ordering
him to express what is not his conscience as his conscience. '260 In the
case of a corporate party, the court explained, the violation occurs by
forcing a representative "to express his fabricated conscience."
261
Technically, the court's decision applies only to defamation cases
because it hinged on the constitutionality of Section 764, which is lim-
ited to cases of libel or slander. Yet the court's basis for its decision-the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience-seemingly applies
to a broad range of cases without regard to the nature of the action. It is
difficult to imagine what compelled apology would not violate the
court's interpretation of the constitutionally protected freedom of con-
science .262
Thus, the Constitutional Court of Korea in Dong-A-Ilbo disagreed
squarely with the decision of the Supreme Court of Japan in Oguri, de-
cided 35 years earlier. The essential aspects of the two cases are
remarkably similar. Both involved judicial authority to order an apology
against a party in a defamation action under a provision of the states'
respective civil codes, the contents of which were virtually identical.
Both cases weighed the court-ordered apology against the freedom of
conscience, which both constitutions explicitly provide. 64 The essential
256. Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250, at 139.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 89 Hun-Mah 160, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149, 155.
260. Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250, at 139.
261. Id.
262. As Professor Kyu Ho Houm has noted, the court could have decided the case on a
much narrower ground by declaring that a court-ordered apology against the defendant pub-
lisher violates the constitutionally protected freedom of press, S. KOREA CONST. art. 21(1).
Kyu Ho Youm, Jonathan Marshall First Amendment Chair Professor, University of Oregon
School of Journalism and Communication, Remarks at Santa Clara Law School: Korean Law
in the Wake of Globalization (Apr. 22, 2005). The court did not refer to the right of dignity,
which is also provided for in the Constitution. S. KOREA CONST. art. 10 ("All citizens shall be
assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue happiness.").
263. Compare supra notes 221 (Civil Code art. 723) and 251 (Civil Act § 764).
264. JAPAN CONST. art. 19; S. KOREA CONST. art. 19. The similarity of Korean law to
Japanese law is not mere coincidence. Much of the civil law system implemented in Korea
during the Japanese occupation was kept intact after liberation. Thus, a significant portion of
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core of the Constitutional Court's decision in Dong-A-Ilbo appears in the
dissenting opinions in Oguri. Specifically, the dissent in Oguri described
the previous practice of ordering an apology in defamation cases as "a
bad custom" that should be overruled. 265 The Constitutional Court quite
agreed, and like the dissent in Oguri, found constitutional restrictions on
continuing the practice. The minority in Oguri described freedom of
conscience as including "the inward freedom to make distinctions be-
tween right and wrong... [as well as] the freedom to announce or not to
announce to the outside world one's judgments in regard to distinctions
between right and wrong.''266 Similarly, the court in Dong-A-Ilbo saw
freedom of conscience as a freedom of "inner thought from the state's
intervention of people's ethical judgment of the right or wrong and the
good or bad.
' 267
How the Constitutional Court in Dong-A-Ilbo chose to place the
freedom of silence in the framework of the Korean Constitution distin-
guishes the Korean approach to court-ordered apologies from the U.S.
approach. In the United States, the freedom of speech in the First
Amendment entails the right not to speak.26 The Korean Constitution
also provides for freedom of speech, 269 and the Constitutional Court
could have construed it to contain a similar right. Instead, the court
chose the approach previously seen in Justice Tarumi's dissent in
Oguri,27° finding the freedom of silence in the fundamental right of free-
dom of conscience, a right the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly
provide. This decision gave the Constitutional Court the opportunity to
elaborate, 27' however amorphously, on the legal dimensions of a right that
is likely universally desired but difficult to delineate. Although the court
did not specifically identify the requisite conditions of an actionable claim
Korean laws are still based on their Japanese counterparts. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND
LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 103, at 528. Although the original Korean Constitution
adopted in 1948 is said to have been a product of leading Korean legal scholars and jurists,
much of it read similarly to the Japanese Constitution, which was shaped and approved by
General Douglas MacArthur. For a discussion, see Ilhyung Lee, Equivalence at Law (and
Society): Social Status in Korea, Race in America, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109, 133-37
(2004).
265. MAKI, supra note 215, at 63 (Fujita, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 62.
267. Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250, at 139.
268. See supra text accompanying note 245.
269. S. KOREA CONST. art. 21(1) ("All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the
press, and freedom of assembly and association'").
270. Justice Tarumi had written in dissent in Oguri that the freedom of conscience also
guarantees the right of silence "to those who, as a matter of principle, wish to be silent."
MAKI, supra note 215, at 66 (Tarumi, J., dissenting).
271. Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250, at 139.
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for violation of freedom of conscience, the matter of a court-compelled
apology proved an easy case. 2
Departing from the legal strictures, the Constitutional Court also
noted the impracticalities of a compelled apology. Echoing the concerns
of U.S. commentators and jurists, the court noted that an apology (here,
using the sah-gwah phrase) 273 is meaningless if it is not made voluntarily
or with "deep-rooted regret. 274 Apologizing is a social virtue only if it is
voluntary, the court noted; if not, it is oppressive, punitive, and retalia-
tory.275
It must be noted that the unanimous decision by the Constitutional
Court drew a sharp critique from Professor Dai-Kwon Choi,"' a leading
scholar in Korean constitutional law and sociology of law, who argued
that the court neglected the cultural regard for the apology in Korea. Pro-
272. The Constitutional Court also reasoned that a publication of an apology is an exces-
sive and unnecessary restriction of rights, given the less restrictive means to achieve the same
result-namely, requiring the defendant to pay for publication of the court's civil or criminal
judgment against the defendant, or a retraction of the defamatory story. 89 Hun-Mah 160, 3
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149, 157-58; Notice of Apology Case, supra note 250, at
139. The court's characterization of the freedom of conscience as a fundamental right, its
description of the court-ordered apology as overly extreme, and the reference to less restrictive
alternatives that would satisfy the legislative purpose of providing relief to the plaintiff whose
reputation was harmed sound of analysis seen in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, in a case
that was decided within the first five years of the court's establishment.
273. 89 Hun-Mah 160, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 149, 154-55.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 156-57. Of interest in the Constitutional Court's decision rejecting the legal-
ity of a court-ordered apology is its reference to the approaches taken in other countries on the
same question. The court noted that Japan is the only country to allow court-sanctioned or-
dered apologies, over the substantial objections of commentators, while Anglo-American
jurisdictions and civil law countries like France, Germany, and Switzerland do not. Id. at 157.
The decision was unanimous, and no member of the court objected to any reliance on foreign
precedents in the case. This is in contrast to the still divided views of the members of the U.S.
Supreme Court regarding what weight the Court can give to precedents from other countries.
This matter received prominent mention in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where the
Court, in a deeply divided opinion, held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
capital punishment for juvenile defendants. The majority, per Justice Kennedy, pointed out
that at the time of the decision, the United States was the only country in the world which
permitted the death penalty for juveniles and that the laws of other countries would be "in-
structive" in the Court's task of interpreting the prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishments." Id. at 575-76. This reference to, and reliance on, the views of other countries
brought a sharp rebuke from Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by two other justices, who
wrote that the premise that "American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world
... ought to be rejected out of hand." Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was not
reticent to voice his view that a question of American law should not be determined by the
views of "like-minded foreigners." Id. at 608. Justice O'Connor also dissented from the major-
ity decision but specifically expressed her disagreement with Justice Scalia's contention that
"foreign and international law" should have no place in the decision of the case. Id. at 604
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276. Dai-Kwon Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-Ordered Apology for De-
famatory Remarks, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (2000).
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fessor Choi stated that "cultural dictates ' 277 placed on Korean society
have made the apology "highly desirable and meaningful"27 and "a criti-
cally important factor" 27 9 in the resolution of disputes .2 " Especially in
defamation cases involving harm to the victim's reputation, the apology
is a "culture-bound '28' remedy. Professor Choi saw culture as the pre-
dominating factor in the decision of the case. He was unconvinced with
the court's view that the freedom of conscience should prohibit com-
12pelled apologies and was not troubled by an involuntary apology made
281
only because of a court order.
Professor Choi's reliance on the cultural regard for the apology in
dispute settlement, and his view that Korean culture can and should de-
termine Korean law,2s appear to present a rather extreme form of cultural
determinism-perhaps a "blood-and-soil relativism weighted in favor of
the past."285 His ideas with respect to the apology case bring full circle
277. Id. at 218, 219. Professor Choi referred to a number of Korean sayings that stem
from the "cultural dictates," such as: "[If you encounter a negotiation under way, then have it
completed. If you encounter a dispute under way, then have it resolved... ." and "[Olne can
have even a thousand won debt dissolved with a proper statement." Id. at 219.
278. Id. at 211; see id. at 219 (describing apology as a "desired personality trait").
279. Id. at 212.
280. Professor Choi emphasized the functional aspect of the apology in the settlement of
conflicts and disputes. Id. at 209, 219.
281. Id. at 205, 224; see id. at 209, 211 (noting that "the culture demands an apology of
one who initially offends another's reputation" and that apology is desired "in a culture where
it is demanded of a wrongdoer").
282. He wrote:
Freedom of conscience is designed to protect one's strong conviction that it is mor-
ally wrong to obey what the law forces him to follow. Freedom of conscience
becomes constitutionally relevant only when moral dictates and legal dictates col-
lide, not when the only issue is whether one is willing to follow legal dictates. Thus,
in order for freedom of conscience to be relevant, one has to show a strong moral
(in many cases religiously based) conviction against the legal demand rather than
mere dislike, reluctance or unwillingness to follow the law.
id. at 210.
283. Even acknowledging that "the more voluntary an offer of an apology, the better[,]"
id. at 209, and that "[pierhaps an apology would be meaningless ... unless [it is] voluntarily
made," Professor Choi urged that "[i]n terms of the soothing effect on the person wronged, a
forced apology has the same effect as a voluntary one... " Id. at 211. He added, "An apology
can be just, even if it is enforced by a court of justice." Id. at 220.
284. Professor Choi wrote: "[C]ultural differences are reflected in beliefs and values
which in turn determine law. There is nothing wrong with the cultural importance attachment
of an apology being reflected in judicial decisionmaking" id. at 220; and "[lI]aw is, and should
be, based on the prevailing values, beliefs, and senses of right and wrong in the society where
it functions. To that extent, law can be local" id. at 219. One criticism of this view is that it is
not so clear what "Korean culture" is, given the changes in social attitudes.
285. Shaw, supra note 108, at 19. For a critique of cultural determinism, see YooN, su-
pra note 249, at 32-35.
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the discussion on the relationship between comparative culture and law
with respect to the apology.
IV. CONCLUSION
Culture affects notions of the apology, and indeed, differing cultural
norms in Japan and the United States might explain the dramatically dif-
ferent approaches to the apology in the two states. Generally, when one
causes significant injury or harm to another, the Japanese practice is to
apologize and the American inclination is to refuse an apology. The legal
system in each country is consistent with its societal inclination or disin-
clination to apologize. That is, the Japanese bench and bar expect a party
causing injury to apologize, and the apology becomes part of the settle-
ment process. In contrast, American legal institutions undervalue the
apology and have yet to develop a facilitating use for it.
Korea, Japan's neighbor across the East Sea, is a society rich in cul-
ture and history. It is deeply influenced by Confucian ethics regarding
harmony and conciliation, characteristics that have shaped the frequent
use of the apology in Japan. Those Koreans who adhere to the traditional
Confucian norms emphasizing societal harmony may well prefer an
apology over silence (or denial) in anticipation of litigation. Yet Korea is
a country that has seen remarkable political, economic, technological,
and societal developments in recent decades. Some of the rapid changes
in social attitudes and practices depart from deeply-rooted social286
norms and may yield a less frequent use of the apology in dispute set-
tlement. A sampling of reactions from Korea's legal actors indicate that,
as a whole, the legal system is also in transition regarding the treatment
of the apology.
The matter of the apology-in basic terms, an expression of remorse
and responsibility of wrong-is a complex matter. There is every indica-
tion that the apology is no less complex in Korea. In addition to an
appreciation of the (changing) local culture, understanding the apology
in Korea requires knowledge of the relevant language in the expression
of the apology, high-context communication, custom and practice, and a
legal system in the early years of a constitutional democracy. In an effort
to extend the discussion of the relationship between law, culture, and the
apology beyond the United States and Japan, this Article provides an
introduction to the apology in Korea.287 With this necessary foundation in
286. Perhaps Korea should be regarded as a prime example that a society's cultural atti-
tudes are neither permanent nor monolithic.
287. The differences regarding the apology in Japan and the United States have led to the
observation that "Americans going to Japan often need to learn to apologize more freely, and
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place, further scholarship, including empirical research, should more
fully explore the role of the apology in dispute resolution in the context
of Korean law and Korean culture.
Japanese coming to the United States often need to learn to apologize less freely." Cohen,
Advising Clients, supra note 2, at 1052. It is premature to offer counsel of such broad scope
with respect to the approaches to the apology in the United States and Korea.
Fall 2005]
